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ABSTRACT
Family law is simultaneously moving toward and away from
formalist decision making. Examining family law across its various
component doctrines—custody disputes, child support, jurisdiction,
and parentage—reveals these two competing trends. In some of these
areas, scholars and lawmakers have recognized that litigating under
open-ended, amorphous standards is unpredictable and often
painful, with costs that undermine the very purposes served by these
legal frameworks; in these areas we are witnessing a turn toward
determinate rules over judicial discretion as the preferred means of
resolving disputes. In other areas, however, family law is experienc-
ing a trend toward more flexible decision making that prioritizes
functional assessment of relationships above formal legal status.
This Article brings all of these developments into the same frame for
the first time. It asserts that the “functional turn” in some areas of
family law would benefit from the lessons learned in other areas:
that indeterminate standards and contextualized decision making do
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not necessarily provide the best means of doing justice for separating
families. I argue instead for a new formalism, one that extends the
profound advantages of certainty and stability to a wider range of
family relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
Family law is simultaneously moving toward and away from
formalist decision making. Examining family law across its various
component doctrines—custody disputes, jurisdictional frameworks,
child support, and parentage determinations—reveals these two
competing trends. In some of these areas, scholars and lawmakers
have recognized that litigating under open-ended, amorphous
standards is unpredictable and often painful, with costs that
undermine the very purposes served by these legal frameworks.1
The shortcomings of the famously indeterminate standard for
awarding child custody have inspired reform efforts that seek to
provide more certainty and predictability for separating families.
These shifts have already occurred in the laws that govern child
support and the jurisdictional frameworks used to determine where
these disputes should be litigated. In these areas lawmakers have
prioritized determinate rules over judicial discretion as the pre-
ferred means of resolving disputes.
In other areas, however, family law is experiencing a trend
toward more flexible decision making that prioritizes functional
assessment of relationships above formal legal status. With regard
to disputes over parentage between individuals who do not conform
to the traditional template of a heterosexual married couple, there
has been a push for legislatures and courts to acknowledge more
fluid conceptions of family, assigning rights and responsibilities on
the basis of highly individualized assessments.
This Article brings all of these developments into the same frame
for the first time. It demonstrates that the “functional turn” in some
areas of family law would benefit from the lessons learned in other
areas: that indeterminate standards and contextualized decision
making do not necessarily provide the best means of doing justice
for separating families, who turn to the law at junctures of conflict
and strife. Moreover, reliance on the functionalist model of resolving
1. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1987) (asserting that the best-interests standard is “self-defeating,
in that finely tuned consideration of the best interests of each particular child is likely to
impose ‘process costs’ that on balance tend to make children worse off ”). 
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domestic relations disputes perpetuates rather than alleviates
inequality, particularly on the basis of sexual orientation. A family
law framework that emphasizes formal legal status has been
needlessly tethered to a traditionalist view of legitimate family
composition,2 obscuring the extent to which equality requires full
access to legal mechanisms for formalizing relationships.
This Article argues for a new formalism: determinate but not
traditional, it offers predictability and certainty on a much more
inclusive basis than either the old formalism or the functional
analysis that has increasingly been working as family law’s stopgap.
The new formalism I envision incorporates the best features of the
functional turn—emphasis on intent, rejection of hetero-
normativity, focus on the interests of children—while doing much
more to recognize the virtues of determinate rules at moments of
conflict and strife.
I begin in Part I by setting forth a working definition of formalism
and contrasting that to the flexible and discretionary standards that
characterize much of family law. In Part II, I identify areas of family
law in which scholars and lawmakers have recognized the shortcom-
ings of unfettered discretion and have attempted to craft more
determinate rules of decision. These include disputes over the initial
allocation of child custody; petitions to modify existing custody
orders and the jurisdictional frameworks that govern where parties
can litigate such disputes; and the rules that govern the imposition
of child support. In Part III, I identify the contrary trend: when it
comes to ascertaining which individuals our legal system should
recognize as the parents of a child in the first place, we are witness-
ing an increased willingness on the part of courts, scholars, and
lawmakers to embrace flexible, individualized, and functional
assessments of the relationships in question. I critique this
development in Part IV, explaining why it is an inadequate response
to the needs of nontraditional families, one that replicates, in more
extreme form, the uncertainty and instability so thoroughly
2. Cf. Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 21 (2008)
(describing a work that “reveals that the allure of a bi-parentage rule lies in its ability to
naturalize a normative family in which only enduringly monogamous heterosexual couples
reproduce”) (citing COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE, INSTITUTE FOR AM. VALUES, THE
REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND
CHILDREN’S NEEDS 22 (2006)).
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criticized in other areas of family law. Instead, I argue, the law
should offer a re-imagined formalism, one that extends the benefits
of predictability and administrability to a larger and more inclusive
group of families. While this Article does not offer a comprehensive
proposal for this formalist reform, it concludes with some prelimi-
nary ideas for the shape that such reform should take.
I. A WORKING DEFINITION OF FAMILY LAW FORMALISM
Before aligning multiple developments in family law upon any
sort of axis that involves a notion of formalism, it is necessary to
define what formalism is. As Professor Frederick Schauer recog-
nized more than twenty years ago, the scholarly literature reveals
“scant agreement” on what makes a legal decision or framework
formalist, “except that whatever formalism is, it is not good.”3 I
embrace and rely on Professor Schauer’s own description of
formalism as “the concept of decisionmaking according to rule.”4
Nonetheless, we must untangle various strands of formalism to
arrive at a working definition that helps us sort out the trends in
family law with which this Article is concerned.
A. Synthesizing Multiple Notions of Formalism
In a discussion of legal formalism, Professor Lawrence Solum
uses the term “hard law” to describe “determinate legal rules which
draw relatively ‘bright lines.’ ”5 In contrast, another core meaning of
formalism describes a judicial practice: adherence to legal rules
without consideration of purposes, policies, or other concerns
3. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 509-10 (1988) (noting a range of
meanings in the literature, all of them pejorative). 
4. Id. at 510. Schauer elaborates by noting that “[f]ormalism is the way in which rules
achieve their ‘ruleness’ precisely by doing what is supposed to be the failing of formalism:
screening off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise
take into account.” Id. For further discussion of the nature of legal rules, see Robert H.
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 231 nn.20-21. 
5. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Formalism and Instrumentalism, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (Aug. 12, 2012, 9:11 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2012/08/legal-
theory-lexicon-formalism-instrumentalism.html. 
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underlying or external to the rule.6 My observations primarily
concern the first attribute of formalism. Family law has become
increasingly codified in comprehensive statutory schemes, and this
Article is oriented more toward the nature of the rules provided to
judges rather than the method of judging or the interpretive
approach used by the judges to whom the rules are directed.
Professor Schauer captures this distinction by differentiating
between “the denial of choice by the judge” and “the denial of choice
to the judge.”7
This distinction is tenuous, of course, as these two elements of
formalism often converge. Such convergence is reflected in one
author’s description of formalism as resting on the principle that
“well-crafted rules embodied in authoritative texts will constrain the
choice of an impartial decisionmaker.”8 Formalism, then, results
from the combination of determinate legal rules with a judicial
practice of adhering to those rules—even when they result in
outcomes that seem contrary to what a sensitive and unencumbered
decision maker, taking into account all that is relevant, might
produce.9 Although the realist critique has irrevocably weakened the
law’s claim to constrain decision makers and produce neutral
results,10 it remains possible to align legal rules along a spectrum
that reflects more or less judicial discretion.11
For the purposes of this Article, we must add to this understand-
ing an element of formalism that has particular relevance to family
law: the meaning conveyed by the transitive verb “to formalize,”
something one does to a relationship through a set of prescribed
steps, triggering the application of particular legal rules. Marriage
6. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 510. 
7. Id. at 521. 
8. Jeffrey Malkan, Literary Formalism, Legal Formalism, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1393
(1998).
9. See Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1185 (1986) (noting that a system of fixed rules “can
cause hardship or injustice in individual situations, but in most cases they assure
predictability at a low cost”).
10. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
372-73, 382-83 (1978).
11. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 462-63 (1987). 
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is the preeminent example.12 To formalize a relationship13 is to take
action at the intersection of private and public; doing so synchro-
nizes the personal, lived experience with the framework of legal
rights and responsibilities that attend the intentional and voluntary
recognition of such a relationship.14 The connection between the
verb “formalize” and the notions of formalism discussed above is
that a relationship properly formalized in accordance with state-
prescribed procedures is subject to legal rules that do not apply to
other relationships, no matter how functionally equivalent they
might be. In this sense, a system for formalizing certain relation-
ships is “formalist” in that it results in the mechanical application
of legal rules and screens off, from the decision maker, more
nuanced determinations of how the relationship in question actually
functions.
Ultimately, the phenomena I describe in this Article turn on the
quality described by Professor Schauer as “ruleness”: the extent to
which family law doctrines provide determinate instructions that
can be more or less mechanically applied to domestic relations
disputes.15
12. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative
Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 780 (1995) (“Tremendous
legal and symbolic benefits inure to couples who formalize their relationships in marriage.”);
Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 43 (1996) (“What
would a world without marriage look like? First, all couples who wished to formalize their
understandings of personal and financial commitment and responsibility would have to do so
for themselves, that is, without the state’s provision of a default set of rules known as the
marriage contract.”). 
13. “To formalize” has a similar usage in contract law, which is interesting given the
theory that marriage has moved from a status to a contract. See HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW
100, 183-84, 191 (Everyman’s Library 1965).
14. Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 242-43 (“The formality of marital status, together
with the requirement of legal action for both entry into marriage and divorce, clarifies the
meaning of the commitment that the couple [is] making and underscores its seriousness....
Although wedding ceremonies vary a great deal depending on the couple’s religious traditions,
wealth, and preferences, all couples must register their marriage with civil authorities as a
legal change in status. The formality of the occasion encourages deliberation and
solemnity—an acknowledgment that the decision represents an important commitment and
the undertaking of legal obligations between the spouses. Finally, the nature and extent of
these obligations are defined by the formal legal status.”).
15. Schauer, supra note 3, at 510. That some of these determinate instructions become
controlling upon an individual or a couple intentionally embracing the rights and
responsibilities of a particular legal status will become increasingly relevant as we proceed;
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B. Contrasting These Qualities with Flexible Standards
As most students of family law quickly learn, many of the
decisional frameworks in family law lack “ruleness.”16 They instead
vest judges with enormous discretion to rely on their individual
assessments of purposes, policies, and context.17 Laws of this type
provide little more instruction to judges than “decide what is right,
under the circumstances.”18 To the extent that lawmakers have
attempted to provide more concrete guidance by fleshing out the
factors judges must consider in resolving family law disputes, the
resulting standards seem to sweep in everything short of the parties’
respective astrological signs.19 We will see a variety of examples
illustrating this type of legal framework.20 For now, let us character-
ize these as contextualized, functionalist, and flexible nearly to the
point of radical indeterminacy—everything that formalism is not.21
I put this to the side for now.
16. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 9, at 1167-70 (“[Family law] is characterized by more
discretion than any other field of private law.... [T]rial judges have been expressly granted
broad discretion to try to achieve individualized justice on a case-by-case basis.”); see also Ira
Mark Ellman, Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 871 (1999) (endeavoring to
show “that rules of largely limitless discretion are common in family law, and that their
prevalence is not a good thing”); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 970 n.64 (1979) (characterizing as
still apt the observation made in 1939 that “[j]udicial discretion is probably nowhere ... given
freer rein, than in the field of domestic relations”) (quoting Edward W. Cooby, The Exercise
of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 213 (1939));
Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The Child Support
Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 209-10 (1991) (asserting that nowhere do legal scholars
justify “broad, unfettered judicial discretion more than in family law”); Kimberly D. Richman,
Talking Back: The Discursive Role of the Dissent in LGBT Custody and Adoption Cases, 16
LAW & SEXUALITY 77, 81 (2007) (noting that family law is notoriously vague and
indeterminate).
17. See Glendon, supra note 9, at 1167.
18. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 16, at 870 (discussing “family law’s version of Rule 1:
decide as you see fit”); Glendon, supra note 9, at 1171 (noting the meaningless direction to
judges to do what is “equitable,” “just,” or “equitable and just”).
19. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 518 (noting that, whatever other choices may or may not
be available to judges within the American legal system, resolving a case on the grounds that
one party was a Capricorn and the other a Sagittarius is not one of them). 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989) (“Law is
indeterminate to the extent that legal questions lack single right answers. In adjudication,
law is indeterminate to the extent that authoritative legal materials and methods permit
multiple outcomes to lawsuits.”). 
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C. An Admittedly Imperfect Typology for Classifying Family Law   
    Rules
Does this framework merely recapitulate the familiar (and itself
over-determined) distinction between rules and standards that is a
staple of nearly every first year law student experience?22 In large
part, it probably does.23 But it is nonetheless a helpful typology for
understanding the two competing trends in family law, and for
thinking critically about how to take the best of both in designing
frameworks that accommodate the dizzying rate of social and
technological change manifesting itself in domestic relations
disputes.24 In the section that follows, I discuss areas in which
22. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989) (identifying “the dichotomy between general rules and personal discretion within
the narrow context of law that is made by the courts”); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards,
33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (exploring the debate among legal thinkers of rules versus
standards).
23. It tracks very closely, for example, with the notion of rules and standards offered in
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). She
suggests:
[a] legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. Rules aim to
confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective
value choices to be worked out elsewhere.... A rule necessarily captures the
background principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of over- or
under-inclusiveness. But the rule's force as a rule is that decisionmakers follow
it, even when direct application of the background principle or policy to the facts
would produce a different result.
Id. at 58 (footnotes omitted). A standard, in contrast: 
tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the
background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards allow for the
decrease of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker
more discretion than do rules. Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into
account all relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the
application of a standard in one case ties the decisionmaker's hand in the next
case less than does a rule—the more facts one may take into account, the more
likely that some of them will be different the next time.
Id. at 58-59 (footnotes omitted).
24. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.02 cmt. c, at 98 (2000) (“The question for rule-makers is not
whether the law in this area should require determinacy or permit unbridled judicial
discretion. It is, rather, what blend of determinacy and discretion produces the best
combination of predictable and acceptable results, and what substantive values are most
appropriately reflected in the mix.”); Glendon, supra note 9, at 1166 (urging “a search for the
proper mix of discretion and fixed rules under each set of circumstances—the optimum degree
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scholars and lawmakers have recognized the shortcomings of
flexible standards for family law decision making and have sought
to develop more determinate legal frameworks.
II. RETURNING TO DETERMINATE RULES
A trans-substantive review of family law reveals that “over the
past three decades, one theme that emerges is the movement from
broad judicial discretion toward more certain rules of adjudica-
tion.”25 The standard for awarding child custody, the procedural
frameworks that determine where and when parties can litigate
child custody, and the rules for calculating child support are at
varying stages of this transition, making it interesting to look at
them comparatively.
A. Child Custody
Family law’s best-known legal framework directs judges in almost
every state to decide child custody disputes according to the “best
interests of the child.”26 Most custody statutes flesh out this best-
interests standard with enumerated factors for judges to consider.
For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, upon which
several state laws are modeled,27 instructs judges to:
consider all relevant factors including: (1) the wishes of the
child’s parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the
child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelation-
ship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child’s best
of fine-tuning without losing coherence and predictability, of reasonable certainty without
losing flexibility”). 
25. James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: The American
Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 923, 926
(quoting Ira Mark Ellman, Chief Reporter’s Preface to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. II, Apr. 18, 1998),
at xiii). 
26. See Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6
(1997).
27. See Marriage and Divorce Act, Model Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://
uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Marriage+and+Divorce+Act,+Model (last visited Mar. 31,
2014).
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interests; (4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and
community; and (5) the mental and physical health of all
individuals involved.28
As with the UMDA, many of the factors provided in these statutes
are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive;29 in some
jurisdictions the enumerated factors conclude with a catchall that
instructs the judge to consider any “other factors relevant to the
parent-child relationship.”30
Especially in contrast to the approaches it replaced, which
provided fixed rules for child custody that were explicitly gender-
based,31 the best-interests standard “seems wonderfully simple,
egalitarian, and flexible.”32 It also, as one scholar has observed,
“expresses the right societal message about the responsibility of
parents to put their children's interests first.”33 But the praise is
faint in comparison to the criticism; these same commentators go on
to assert that the standard “has no objective content”34 and “is not
determinate enough to produce predictable results, yielding instead
a process that is contentious, expensive, subjective, and unjust.”35
They are joined by a legion of scholars who have produced a body of
criticism that is as extensive as the standard is amorphous.36
A recurrent line of criticism observes that the vagueness of the
best-interests standard provides a vessel for the personal biases and
28. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1973). 
29. See Janet M. Bowermaster, Legal Presumptions and the Role of Mental Health
Professionals in Child Custody Proceedings, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 265, 269 (2002).
30. See, e.g., Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So. 2d 943, 947 (Miss. 2001).
31. The earliest rules for awarding custody viewed children as chattel, assignable to their
father as head of the household in what operated as an absolute paternal preference. See
William Weston, Putative Fathers’ Rights to Custody—A Rocky Road at Best, 10 WHITTIER L.
REV. 683, 686 & n.18 (1989). This eventually gave way to maternal preference, especially for
children of “tender years.” See Elster, supra note 1, at 7-10.
32. David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce,
83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984). But see id. at 488 (noting that the standard “has no objective
content”).
33. Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
809, 849 (1998). But see Elster, supra note 1, at 16-17 (criticizing the best-interests standard
for failing to take account of the needs and rights of the parents). 
34. Chambers, supra note 32, at 488.
35. Bartlett, supra note 33, at 849.
36. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 26, at 17. 
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ideologies of the presiding judge with regards to gender,37 race,38
religion,39 and sexual orientation.40 To this list we could add
disability,41 educational attainment,42 and likely any other point of
difference between the parties that strikes the judge as relevant to
parenting ability and the interests of children.43 Critics have also
noted that unlike most forms of adjudication, which involve the
determination of historical fact,44 applying the standard requires a
prediction about a particular child’s future well-being.45 Because this
is an assessment beyond the institutional competence of judges,46
custody trials reflect heavy reliance on expert testimony,47 making
37. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 85-94 (1991); Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo,
and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 175-83 (1992); Penelope E. Bryan,
Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 713, 725 (2000); Martha
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 735 (1988); Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is
the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 350 (1993) (asserting the
best-interests standard is permeated with gender bias).
38. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1994); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity,
Difference, and Mystery: Children’s Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 61-63 (1994)
(noting that the best-interests standard invites race, class, and cultural bias).
39. See, e.g., Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992); Joshua S. Press, The Uses and
Abuses of Religion in Child Custody Cases: Parents Outside the Wall of Separation, 84 IND.
L.J. SUPP. 47, 47-48 (2009) (noting that parents have been “penalized in custody proceedings
for being too religious, not religious enough, or for belonging to an unpopular religious sect”)
(footnote omitted). 
40. See, e.g., Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay
Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623 (1996). 
41. See, e.g., Carney v. Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979). 
42. See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
43. See, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154-56 (Iowa 1966) (considering a
parent’s “unconventional, arty, Bohemian” lifestyle); Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So. 2d 943, 949,
951 (Miss. 2001) (considering a “messy house” and purported misrepresentation regarding a
sexual relationship); Jones v. Jones, 542 N.W.2d 119, 122 (S.D. 1996) (considering the benefits
of an extended family network and farm upbringing).
44. See Mnookin, supra note 4, at 251.
45. More specifically, courts must determine the marginal increase in future well-being
that the child would experience with one fit parent as compared to the other fit parent. See
id. at 257.
46. Glendon, supra note 9, at 1181 (“The ‘best interests’ standard is a prime example of
the futility of attempting to achieve perfect, individualized justice by reposing discretion in
a judge or other third party.... [I]t asks the judge to do what is almost impossible: evaluate the
child-caring capacities of a mother and a father at a time when family relations are apt to be
most distorted by the stress of separation and the divorce process itself. The idea that a judge
can determine the best interests of a child under such circumstances is a fantasy.”).
47. See, e.g., Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362.
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them more expensive and inviting the risk of results that are
distorted by the parties’ respective abilities and willingness to spend
money on a battle of the experts.
The utter inability to predict how any case would be resolved
under the standard has been the point of most persistent concern.
Scholars have identified several distinct problems that stem from
the standard’s amorphousness. The enormous discretion it affords
to judges has been described as “difficult to reconcile with an
historic commitment to the rule of law,” raising concerns about the
legitimate exercise of judicial authority in one of the most conse-
quential aspects of litigants’ lives.48 Scholars have asserted that the
standard’s vagueness promotes and protracts litigation,49 with costs
to all parties but especially the very children it is designed to
protect. Even when parties attempt to avoid litigation, uncertainty
about how the court would rule in the absence of settlement
exacerbates power imbalances between the parents and fosters bad
faith negotiation. As Professors Robert Mnookin and Lewis
Kornhauser famously elaborated in Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law, the inability to predict what a judge would decide facili-
tates a dynamic in which one party may threaten to seek custody so
as to obtain concessions from the other party with regards to
property distribution and spousal maintenance.50 In the absence of
any clear standard for assessing whether the strategic move will be
successful, the prospect of losing custody becomes a credible threat,
potentially inducing parents with the stronger bond to their children
to forego financial awards to which they are entitled.
48. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary
Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 499-500 (1990).
49. Glendon, supra note 9, at 1181 (noting that the vagueness of the best-interests
standard “provides maximum incentive to those who are inclined to wrangle over custody”);
see also Elster, supra note 1, at 24 (arguing that, under the best-interests standard, “more
cases will be brought than if there existed a strong presumption rule or an automatic decision
procedure because both parties may persuade themselves that they stand a chance of getting
custody”); Mnookin, supra note 4, at 262 (“[T]he use of an indeterminate standard makes the
outcome of litigation difficult to predict. This may encourage more litigation than would a
standard that made the outcome of more cases predictable. Because each divorcing parent can
often make plausible arguments why a child would be better off with him or her, a best-
interests standard probably creates a greater incentive to litigate than would a rule that
children should go to the parent of the same sex.”).
50. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 972-73 & n.77.
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 Judges tasked with applying the standard have been similarly
critical,51 describing it as “no more definable than is the expression
‘as long as a rope.’ ”52 An emphasis on the standard’s indeterminacy
and unfettered discretion unites all but one of these distinct strands
of scholarly and judicial criticism.53
The development of collateral rules about the proper application
of the best-interests standard reflects an effort to cabin some of that
discretion. For example, consider that numerous iterations of the
standard include, as an enumerated factor for the judge’s consider-
ation, the “moral fitness of the parents.”54 Given the vagueness of
this factor and the utter lack of social consensus regarding what it
means to be morally fit, the potential for mischief in the use of this
factor is fairly evident. To curb the most blatant abuses, appellate
courts have reversed lower court decisions when the supposed moral
unfitness was unrelated to the child’s well-being.55 Requiring some
nexus between the child’s interests and the parental conduct being
invoked as a basis to deny custody is one way to limit judicial
disapproval of certain parental conduct from masquerading as
concern for children. Appellate courts have also insisted on some
procedural safeguards, such as requiring the trial judge to weigh
each factor individually, to identify the facts in the record that
pertain to the application of a particular factor, and to state which
parent is favored under each particular factor.56
51. See, e.g., Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362; Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168 (1984).
52. Perkins v. Courson, 135 S.E.2d 388, 399 (Ga. 1964) (Duckworth, C.J., dissenting). 
53. The notable exception is the argument regarding institutional competence, which
asserts that the standard requires judges to deploy expertise they do not have in order to
arrive at the correct result. This is distinct from the charge that the standard has no correct
result. 
54. See, e.g., Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So. 2d 943, 947, 949-50 (Miss. 2001).
55. See, e.g., Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 544 N.W.2d 93, 101-02 (Neb. 1996) (giving little
weight to mother’s moral conduct that did not “adversely affect[ ] her son”); see also
Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368, 372-73 (Neb. 1997); Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525
N.W.2d 37, 39, 41 (S.D. 1994).
56. See, e.g., Hollon, 784 So. 2d at 951-52. 
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Even with these collateral requirements,57 however, the stan-
dard’s primary virtue seems to be of the sort that Winston Churchill
famously observed regarding democratic government: it is the worst
system except for all the others.58 Its tenacity as the overwhelmingly
prevalent approach for resolving child custody disputes is attribut-
able to the difficulty scholars and lawmakers have had crafting a
tolerable alternative, one that ameliorates the problems posed by
the standard’s indeterminacy while still accommodating two
fundamental truths: not only are all families different from one
another,59 but each family is different after a dissolution than it was
before.60
The dilemma is perhaps best expressed in one of the early and
now oft-cited critiques of indeterminacy in custody law:
57. These requirements are enforceable only through appellate review. Although this is
true of all constraints imposed on trial judges, there is reason to be concerned that errors in
custody decision making are particularly immune from appellate review. See Law &
Hennessey, supra note 37, at 351; Murphy, supra note 16, at 214-15; Joan D. Wexler,
Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 762 (1985). First,
domestic relations litigants are more likely to lack the funds necessary to pursue error
correction on appeal. See Fitzgerald, supra note 38, at 62 n.331; Nancy K. D. Lemon, Statutes
Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against Custody Batterers: How Effective Are They?, 28
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601, 674 (2001); Murphy, supra note 16, at 219-20, 237. Second, the
passage of time while an appeal is pending works against the losing parent in a way that does
not have an analogue in other areas of the law: not only does the parent lose years with the
child that will never be recovered, but because of the importance of stability to the child
concerned, courts sometimes express reluctance to reverse even admittedly erroneous custody
decisions. See Linda D. Elrod, When Should Custody Orders Be Modified? Flexibility Versus
Stability, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 2004, at 40, 40; Elster, supra note 1, at 23-24.
58. CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF 573 (Richard M. Langworth ed., 2008). 
59. ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY 164 (2004) (“The best
interests test does have a great moral virtue—it directs the child custody court to thoroughly
review each child’s particular circumstances without preconceptions or presumptions. The
individualized nature of the inquiry is a tribute to our society’s collective sense that
relationships between children and parents are unique and should be judged individually.”);
Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family Law: A Report and
Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229, 234-35 (1993) (defending discretion by noting “that it gives a
judge authority to respond to the full range of circumstances a case presents and thus to do
justice in each individual case.... [T]he need for individualized justice in family law is
particularly pressing. People organize and conduct their family lives in a burgeoning and
bewildering variety of ways. And a court’s resolution of a family dispute will matter to the
parties more deeply and durably than in perhaps any other kind of civil litigation.”).
60. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 967 (noting that parental needs and
preferences with regards to division of child-rearing responsibilities may change dramatically
upon dissolution). 
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Because what is in the best interests of a particular child is
indeterminate, there is good reason to be offended by the
breadth of power exercised by a trial court judge in the resolu-
tion of custody disputes. But the underlying reasons for this
indeterminacy—our inability to make predictions and our lack
of consensus with regard to values—make the formulation of
rules especially problematic.61
Professor Mnookin’s own work reflected the pattern: after incisively
critiquing the indeterminacy of the best-interests standard, he then
carefully considered alternatives and found each of them lacking.62
Law reform efforts have experienced a similar trajectory. Two
states, West Virginia and Minnesota, experimented with a presump-
tion in favor of awarding custody to the parent who had acted as the
primary caretaker prior to dissolution.63 The first and often
dispositive stage of the analysis was an assessment of historical
fact, identifying which parent had performed most of the nurturing
tasks, from preparing meals and conducting the bedtime routine to
inculcating manners, imposing discipline, and fostering the child’s
education.64 Only where that parent was shown to be unfit would
the presumption be rebutted.65
The appeal of the primary caretaker presumption lies in its
ability to correct several of the key shortcomings that characterize
the best-interests standard. It is retrospective rather than predic-
tive and turns on assessments that are more concrete than the
factors that typically comprise the best-interests standard. Surely,
ascertaining which parent bathed and fed the children most of the
time is simpler and less subjective than assessing which parent’s
“moral fitness” or “mental health” is more likely to advance the
child’s interests.
The problem is that the primary caretaker presumption assumes
a past division of caretaking labor that is so unevenly distributed as
61. Mnookin, supra note 4, at 230.
62. Id. at 282-91 (“My conclusion is hardly comforting: while the indeterminate best-
interests standard may not be good, there is no available alternative that is plainly less
detrimental.”).
63. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711-12 (Minn. 1985); Garska v. McCoy, 378
S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
64. Garska, 378 S.E.2d at 363.
65. Id.
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to justify awarding custody to one parent on the basis of past
practice alone. Although it acknowledges the possibility of a fifty-
fifty split in which the presumption does not arise,66 it raises
troubling questions for what we might call the sixty-forty families.
For these families, the presumption makes enormously consequen-
tial what might be trivial differences in the parents’ respective
caretaking duties. The presumption directs the court toward a
winner-take-all result predicated on a much more limited scope of
information than what the best-interests standard would afford.67
States have been unwilling to cabin custody decision making in this
way and for the most part incorporate an assessment of past
caretaking into the best-interests standard, making it one of the
many equally weighted factors for the court to consider.68 It was,
however, precisely the presumptive force of the past caretaking
assessment that gave this alternative approach the potential to dial
back the discretion and indeterminacy inherent in the best-interests
standard.
This experience seems to support one scholar’s assertion that
“custody is surely the most difficult” area within family law “for
which to generate a sensible nondiscretionary rule.”69 But even
in the face of such obstacles, reformers have been laboring to
produce a more determinate framework for child custody decision
making that cabins discretion and promises more predictable
results.70 In 2002, the lawyers, judges, and law professors that
compose the American Law Institute published a set of principles to
guide lawmakers in revising the law of family dissolution.71 Its
66. See id.
67. See Bartlett, supra note 33, at 853. Compare supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text
(summarizing the breadth of information a court evaluates in the best-interests standard),
with Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363 (detailing the specified parenting tasks a court evaluates to
determine which parent is the primary caretaker).
68. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in
Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 393, 400 (2008);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 615,
621-22 (1992).
69. Ellman, supra note 16, at 876. 
70. See Bartlett, supra note 33, at 846 (“[T]he [ALI] principles offer determinacy in
decisionmaking without presupposing, or attempting to promote, a standard family
scenario.”). 
71. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(2000).
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recommended approach to resolving custody disputes instructs
judges to allocate custodial responsibility so that the amount of time
each parent will spend with the child after dissolution approximates
the proportion of time the parent spent on caretaking duties prior
to the separation.72 The approximation approach had been first
advocated by Professor Elizabeth Scott, who argued that a custody
arrangement that approximates “as closely as possible the pred-
ivorce patterns of parental responsibility” was “likely to be less
disruptive to the child,” more reliably reflective of the parents’ true
preferences, and thus more stable over time than any possible
alternative.73
Like the primary caretaker presumption, the approximation
approach prioritizes past caretaking above any other parental
attribute, but it improves upon the primary caretaker presumption
by calibrating the effect of pre-divorce patterns on post-divorce
custodial arrangements. Rather than identifying the parent who
performed the majority of caretaking tasks prior to dissolution and
awarding custody to that parent, relegating the other parent to
visitation, it would give each parent a post-divorce role that reflects,
as much as possible, the relationship between parent and child prior
to the divorce. It thus avoids the sixty-forty problem described
above: what might be marginal differences in the amount of
parental responsibility shouldered prior to divorce would result in
only marginal differences in the amount of post-divorce time spent
with the child.
The approximation approach does not promise to eliminate the
discord that accompanies disputes over custody. As with any
custody rule, a court will apply it only to those parents in such
profound conflict that they are unable to arrive at an agreement
regarding the allocation of parenting rights and responsibilities.
Such parents will fight about whatever the governing standard
identifies as relevant; we therefore can expect parents to challenge
each other’s assessments of past division of labor.74 But the question
72. Id. § 2.08(1), at 178. The Principles identify eight exceptions to the rule of
approximation, including keeping siblings together, accommodating the preferences of older
children, protecting children from domestic abuse, and avoiding extreme impracticality or
“substantial and almost certain harm to the child.” Id. § 2.08(1), at 178-79.
73. Scott, supra note 68, at 630.
74. See Andrew Schepard, Law and Children: ALI’s Approximation Rule for Child Custody
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is whether something can be gained by channeling parental
acrimony into a focused, retrospective inquiry that does not require
the assistance of experts and clearly identifies the basis for decision.
A number of influential scholars agree that the answer is yes. As
Professor Ellman has observed:
While hardly a mechanical rule, one can see that this section
provides a much more predictable rubric for deciding custody
cases than does the typical best interest standard. One starts
any custody inquiry with a presumptively correct result, which
is alone an important advance over the best interests test, which
does not even provide any tiebreaker rule.75
The approximation approach reflects the lessons learned from prior
efforts to improve child custody decision making: it illustrates the
possibility of a custody rule that offers more predictability than the
best-interests standard and yet allows for individually tailored
results that reflect the particular circumstances of any given
family.76
Notwithstanding scholarly enthusiasm, lawmakers have been
slow to replace the best-interests standard with the approximation
approach.77 Some observers credit the latter approach with growing
influence, however, noting that courts have praised the rationale
upon which it rests and that it is under “serious consideration in
Disputes, N.Y. L.J., May 10, 2004, at 20 (“Custody tests based on past caretaking invite
parents to exaggerate and argue about their contributions to childrearing.”).
75. Ellman, supra note 16, at 877. 
76. See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Preference, Presumption, Predisposition, and Common
Sense: From Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American Law Institute’s Family Dissolution
Project, 36 FAM. L.Q. 11, 18-19 (2002); DiFonzo, supra note 25, at 923 (characterizing the ALI
Principles as seeking to substitute “discrete rules” for the “largely limitless discretion ...
common in family law”) (quoting Ellman, supra note 16, at 871).
77. Only one state has done so. See W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206 (2013).
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other jurisdictions.”78 At this point, it is simply too soon to tell what
kind of impact it will ultimately have.79
In sum, child custody can be fairly characterized as the arena in
which the most has been written and the least has been done about
the shortcomings of discretion and indeterminacy in resolving
family law disputes. These insights, however, have had a profound
effect on other areas of family law, in which lawmakers have heeded
the call to craft more certain and predictable rules for family law
decision making.
B. Procedural Frameworks
A preference for determinate rules is emerging in the procedural
frameworks that govern where child custody litigation takes place
and when parties can re-initiate such litigation. Even if one views
the best-interests standard as the most tolerable rubric for achiev-
ing justice in the original custody dispute, its indeterminance offers
the prospect of a different result in front of a different judge, or with
arguably new facts, providing an incentive for disappointed parents
to relitigate. As the harmful effects of this indeterminance have
become apparent, lawmakers have responded by constraining the
discretion of judges to revisit child custody disputes after the initial
decree has been issued, imposing relatively determinate rules about
when and where a court can hear these successive petitions.
78. See, e.g., Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child
Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law Institute’s “Approximation Rule,” 41 U.
BALT. L. REV. 83, 87 (2011). For criticisms of the approximation approach, see Richard A.
Warshak, Punching the Parenting Time Clock: The Approximation Rule, Social Science, and
the Baseball Bat Kids, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 600 (2007). Emily Buss asserts that the ALI’s
approach “fails to account for the difference between those arrangements worked out
cooperatively, when custodial authority is not an issue, and those arrangements that are
compelled by a court, when that authority is contested.” Emily Buss, Parental Rights, 88 VA.
L. REV. 635, 645 (2002). 
79. It is interesting to note that in 1979, when Mnookin and Kornhauser wrote
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, joint custody had been “seriously proposed” but not
adopted in any jurisdiction. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 977-78. Since then, a
number of jurisdictions have adopted some form of joint custody. See Bartlett, supra note 33,
at 850. Scholars have noted that joint custody regimes can also produce strategic behavior.
See Joanne Schulman & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of
Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 539,
550-51 (1982).
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1. Modification
Much of the reasoning that justifies the use of an inordinately
flexible standard for the initial custody decree could support the
same approach to post-decree matters. After all, if meeting the
needs and interests of individual children requires open-ended,
highly discretionary decision making in the first instance, so too one
might argue that judges must be unconstrained in their authority
to rehear custody disputes that arise after the initial determination.
A wide array of post-divorce changes might have bearing on the best
interests of the children involved—parents move, take new jobs,
remarry, suffer setbacks or improvements in their mental, physical,
emotional, or financial well-being, and of course the children
themselves grow older and present new and different needs that
might change the custody calculus.80 Mnookin and Kornhauser
describe as “obvious” the insight that “because people’s lives change,
an arrangement that benefits the child at one stage may not benefit
the child at some later stage.”81 And indeed, the traditional ap-
proach to adjudicating requests for custody modification reflects the
primacy of this idea: typically, one seeking modification of a custody
decree has been required to show a substantial change in circum-
stances warranted a change in custody.82 Some jurisdictions have
dispensed with the change in circumstances requirement altogether,
authorizing the court to modify the initial custody order whenever
doing so would be in the best interests of the children.83 In these
80. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 612 (1958) (“Because the child’s welfare is
the controlling guide in a custody determination, a custody decree is of an essentially
transitory nature. The passage of even a relatively short period of time may work great
changes, although difficult of ascertainment, in the needs of a developing child. Subtle, almost
imperceptible, changes in the fitness and adaptability of custodians to provide for such needs
may develop with corresponding rapidity. A court that is called upon to determine to whom
and under what circumstances custody of an infant will be granted cannot, if it is to perform
its function responsibly, be bound by a prior decree of another court.”). 
81. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 984.
82. See JUDITH AREEN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW 948 (6th ed. 2012) (“Some
courts, however, have construed the modification standard rather loosely, so that parents who
lose the initial custody decision can fairly easily find a basis for relitigating the issue.”). 
83. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1) (2013). In some jurisdictions, courts are free to order a
modification without any demonstration of changed circumstances if the original decree was
the product of agreement between the parties or if the court was simply unaware of the facts
giving rise to the modification motion. Wexler, supra note 57, at 767-72.
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cases, the indeterminacy of the best-interests standard becomes
multiplied by the virtually infinite number of times it might be used
to resolve custody disputes in the same family. But even the
traditional modification standard, which ostensibly requires the
demonstration of relevant changed circumstances, vests the judge
with nearly as much discretion as the judge exercised in the original
dispute; as one commentator observes, “The court decides what
constitutes a change in circumstances and whether that change has
an impact on a child’s interests on the facts of each case, and the
court’s appraisal of the individuals and circumstances before it is
accorded great weight on any appeal.”84 As it turns out, requiring
the demonstration of changed circumstances as a condition of
modifying a prior custody order is to require very little.85
Take, as an example, a case in which divorcing parents originally
stipulated to joint legal custody of a young child, with primary
residential custody for the mother and liberal visitation for the
father.86 Over three years later, the father filed emergency motions
to modify custody because the child’s second grade teacher reported
a decline in her school performance.87 The court set the matter for
a hearing, at which the teacher testified that the child,“an excep-
tionally bright student, performed very well during the first two
quarters of the school year but had struggled during the third and
fourth quarters.”88 The teacher identified several notations in the
child’s weekly progress reports indicating that she “had failed to
turn in homework and had been talking in class.”89 According to the
teacher, the child “was not applying herself as she had in the past”
and “did not complete her assignments and refused to revise her
work” in spite of being requested to do so.90 The teacher testified
that she had frequent contact with the child’s father, who regularly
inquired about the child’s performance but “very little contact” with
the child’s mother.91
84. Wexler, supra note 57, at 762. 
85. See id. at 795.
86. Ellis v. Carucci, 161 P.3d 239 (Nev. 2007). As is very common, this agreement between
the parents was incorporated into the decree. Id. at 240.
87. Id. at 240, 243.
88. Id. at 240.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 240-41. The father testified that he met with the teacher at least once every two
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The district court granted the motion to modify, ordering a joint
physical custody arrangement in which the child would spend
alternating weeks with each parent.92 The court stated that the
child’s “school performance was the key substantial issue” and
concluded that the teacher’s testimony “constituted sufficient
evidence of changed circumstances to warrant a modification.”93 The
state supreme court affirmed.94 In identifying the legal standard it
was applying, the appeals court specified that “[a] modification of
primary physical custody is warranted only when (1) there has been
a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the
child, and (2) the modification would serve the child’s best
interest.”95 It then determined that both of those elements were
satisfied.96
Perhaps this particular result poses few concerns; rather than
transferring custody from the mother to the father, the court
ordered a shared arrangement in which the child would spend equal
time with each of her two caring, involved, and attentive parents.97
But the primary point is not whether modifying custody in this
instance was wise, beneficial, or merely harmless.98 Instead, the
essential point is that if talking in class and failing to turn in
homework is a “substantial change in circumstances” that warrants
a change in custody, then surely almost anything is. The most ten-
uous proffer of changed circumstances thus entitles a disappointed
weeks and communicated frequently via e-mail; he also asserted that “because he and his new
wife emphasize education, he believed they could best assist [the child] in her studies.” Id. at
241. The mother testified that “she and her new husband often assisted [the child] with her
homework” and that in her view the child’s academic performance had declined as a result of
increased stress associated with the ongoing dispute between her parents. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 244.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. But see Wexler, supra note 57, at 758-59, 766-67, 769-70 (discussing cases in
which the original custodial parent truly does lose primary custody as a result of a
modification motion). 
98. This is certainly a valid question, however, especially if we think that stability and
continuity are important values to prioritize in the adjudication of modification petitions. The
Ellis court itself mentioned this, citing to a number of cases in which stability and continuity
were discussed. See Ellis, 161 P.3d at 242 & n.11. Notably, the state supreme court’s decision
affirming the modification was issued six and a half years after the original decree, a
remarkably long time for a family’s custodial arrangement to be in flux. Id. at 239-40.
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parent to a relitigation of custody, reopening the wildly indetermi-
nate inquiry anew. Even if the parent is ultimately unsuccessful in
obtaining a modification, the costs of reinitiating an adversarial
dispute, combined with the demonstrated harms this poses for the
children whose interests are purportedly being protected,99 under-
mine the goals of stability and certainty, multiplying the deficien-
cies of the best-interests standard.100
For all these reasons, the drafters of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act approached the issue of custody modification in a
considerably more determinate, less discretionary fashion. Although
only six states have formally adopted the UMDA,101 its approach to
modification has been influential in many jurisdictions,102 despite its
considerable divergence from the traditional standard. The first
notable departure from the traditional standard is a post-divorce
waiting period: the UMDA prohibits modification motions within
two years of a custody decree,103 unless the parent seeking modifica-
tion can provide affidavits indicating a “reason to believe the child’s
present environment may endanger seriously his physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health.”104 Once a modification motion is
properly before the court, the court may grant it in three specified
circumstances: 
(1) the custodian agrees to the modification; (2) the child has
been integrated into the family of the petitioner with consent of
the custodian; or (3) the child’s present environment endangers
seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and
99. See, e.g, Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of
Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 123-24 (1997).
100. See id. at 124. Modification motions can be used, for example, to harass and scrutinize
the custodial parent. See Wexler, supra note 57, at 774.
101. Marriage and Divorce Act, supra note 27 (identifying enactment of the UMDA in
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, and Washington). For a slightly different
count, see Sally Adams, Avoiding Round Two: The Inadequacy of Current Relocation Laws
and a Proposed Solution, 43 FAM. L.Q. 181, 183 & n.7 (2009) (citing UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 159 (prefatory note) (1998)) (identifying eight states as having
enacted the UMDA: Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
and Washington).
102. ROBERT E. OLIPHANT & NANCY VER STEEGH, FAMILY LAW 191 (2013). 
103. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 409(a), 9A(II) U.L.A. 439 (1998). 
104. Although this mitigates the force of the waiting period, it prohibits a noncustodial
parent from arguing integration or consent until two years have passed. Id. Also, the two-year
waiting period has a communicative value about the importance of repose. 
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the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by its advantages to him.105
Given that the first two circumstances require some demonstration
of consent on the part of the custodian, the third is the most likely
to cover contentious modification disputes. The intent to dial back
the discretion prevalent in the traditional standard is apparent in
two aspects of this provision. Not only does the provision require the
determination that there is “serious endangerment,” but it assumes
that some countervailing harm is associated with a change in
environment, and it instructs the court to determine that the risk
of endangerment outweighs the risk of upheaval as a condition to
ordering modification.
Although the UMDA approach has not been foolproof, it commu-
nicates a presumption against modification more clearly than the
alternatives.106 Cast in terms that recall our discussion of formal-
ism, the UMDA approach does much more than the traditional
standard to constrain the choices of decision makers who are asked
to revisit a family’s custodial arrangement.107 It is formalist in the
sense that it accords considerable weight to the very existence of a
custodial decree, regardless of the decree’s actual virtues; it
expresses the view that, except in carefully circumscribed scenarios,
adherence to the original decree takes precedence over trying to
improve upon it.108 Moreover, it expresses that view in a form that
attempts to gain the benefits of “ruleness,” by imposing a fixed two-
year waiting period and identifying three scenarios that constitute
the closed universe of scenarios in which a judge may order
105. Id. § 409(b) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the language of the UMDA modification
provision locates its approach within the traditional standard, stating that the court shall not
modify a prior custody decree “unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since
the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of the prior decree that
a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian, and that the
modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.” Id. But the UMDA then
states that “[i]n applying these standards the court shall retain the custodian appointed
pursuant to the prior decree unless” one of the three specified circumstances is present. Id.
106. Joan Wexler has demonstrated that even under the UMDA standard judges continue
to embrace divergent and insufficient notions of “serious endangerment.” See Wexler, supra
note 57, at 776-79. 
107. See discussion supra Part I.
108. See Wexler, supra note 57, at 774.
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modification.109 The choice in favor of “ruleness” is best seen by
reference to a counterexample: the preference against modification
could have been expressed in flexible, indeterminate language,
instructing the judge to “weigh the interest in stability and continu-
ity against the claim of changed circumstances” before ordering a
modification.
To the extent that the UMDA approach reflects a preference
against modification that is predicated on the competing interests
at stake in that particular posture, it is nonetheless illuminating for
our purposes. The preference against modification is premised on
the insight that infinite exercise of discretion does not materially
advance the substantive interests entrusted to the regime. Even if
it were possible to expect such flawless decision making that the
risk of error was minute, at a certain point, the costs become
prohibitive.110 The UMDA approach to modification can thus fairly
be characterized to reflect a skepticism about judicial discretion and
indeterminate standards that has relevance beyond the particular
context of modification.
2. Jurisdiction
The indeterminacy of the best-interests standard fosters a closely
related but even more troubling dynamic: because it offers no
predictable way to gauge the relative merits of each parent in any
given custody dispute, a disappointed parent might reasonably
expect that the result would be different in front of a different judge.
For better or for worse, however, courts offer parents no opportunity
to go judge shopping within the same jurisdiction as the original
custody dispute: custody orders are not final in the same way as
other judgments, reflecting the notion that the court must be able
to revisit custody disputes as necessary to protect the interests of
the children involved.111 For this reason, post-decree matters are
typically directed to the same judge that presided over the original
109. See discussion supra Part I. 
110. See Weinstein, supra note 99, at 118.
111. JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 11.02, at 497 (4th ed.
2013) (“Custody decrees are not considered final judgments, but may be modified in order to
safeguard the best interests of the child upon changed circumstances.”). 
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dispute.112 Thus, the incentive to try a different judge has the
potential to metastasize into an incentive to take the child to a
different state and try again there.113
Under the traditional approach to custody jurisdiction, there were
few, if any, checks on this incentive. The original decree, not bearing
the mantle of a final judgment, was either treated as outside the
purview of the Full Faith and Credit Clause altogether,114 or was
entitled only to the force it would carry in the courts of the state
where the judgment was entered.115 Because the issuing court would
treat the original decree as subject to modification, so too would the
courts of sister states, who would proceed as if the extant custody
decree was no bar to relitigation.116 Courts would exercise jurisdic-
tion on one of a number of alternative bases—the child’s domicile,
the domicile of one or both parents, or even just the physical
presence of the child117—and then would reconsider the disappointed
parent’s claim to custody under the amorphous best-interests
112. See, e.g., Santos v. Santos, 422 N.E.2d 985, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
113. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 111, § 11.02(A), at 500-01.
114. As one scholar observes, this is an unfortunate paradox given “[t]hat children might
perhaps need the benefits of full faith and credit more than ordinary litigants to assure the
stability of custody arrangements and the continuity of family attachments.” Brigitte M.
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children
Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1969). 
115. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614 (1947). 
116. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (“Even if custody orders were
subject to full faith and credit requirements, the Full Faith and Credit Clause obliges States
only to accord the same force to judgments as would be accorded by the courts of the State in
which the judgment was entered. Because courts entering custody orders generally retain the
power to modify them, courts in other States were no less entitled to change the terms of
custody according to their own views of the child’s best interest.”). 
117. Todd Heine, Home State, Cross-Border Custody, and Habitual Residence Jurisdiction:
Time for a Temporal Standard in International Family Law, 17 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L.
9, 15 (2011); see Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody—Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35
EMORY L.J. 291, 293 (1986) (“[S]tate courts were aggressive in asserting initial jurisdiction
in custody cases without the presence of domicile. Courts commonly asserted jurisdiction in
cases in which it was clear that courts in other jurisdictions potentially had jurisdiction and
an interest in asserting it. Some even asserted jurisdiction in those cases in which a court in
another state had already asserted its jurisdiction.”) (footnotes omitted). One commentator
suggests that during this time period the “true rule” for the exercise of jurisdiction was “the
court’s discretion exclusively governed by the child’s welfare.” Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate
Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Reason v. the Restatement, 51 MICH. L. REV. 345,
357-58 (1953). For additional discussion of the reasoning behind these various approaches to
child custody jurisdiction, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Territoriality, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 369, 378 (1991). 
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standard.118 There was little reason to expect that the court
revisiting the judgment of a sister state would show deference to the
original order: as one commentator has observed, “This may be due
to a tendency of any individual to think that in a situation demand-
ing the wisdom of Solomon he can come closer than anyone else.
And there is always the suspicion that even a judge will be a little
more sympathetic with a constituent.”119
Not only did this give rise to “widespread jurisdictional deadlocks”
in which the same child might be the subject of two conflicting
custody orders from two different states, but it created “a national
epidemic of parental kidna[p]ping.”120 By the early 1980s, commen-
tators were estimating that between 25,000 and 100,000 such
incidents were taking place every year.121 The results of a survey
conducted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws confirmed the “rampant” operation of the “rule of seize
and run” and demonstrated “that many courts freely alter custody
decisions made out-of-state; that conflicting custody decrees in two
states are no rarity; and that innumerable children are without
secure and permanent homes because of severe shortcomings in
interstate custody law.”122
The crisis sparked concurrent responses at the state and federal
levels. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), which authorized four alternative bases for the exercise
of jurisdiction over a child custody case.123 A court was authorized
to exercise jurisdiction if it was located in the child’s “home state,”
defined as “the state in which the child immediately preceding the
time involved lived with [the child’s] parents, a parent, or a person
118. See Wexler, supra note 57, at 761.
119. Bodenheimer, supra note 114, at 1211 (quoting Thomas E. Fairchild, Conflicts of
Jurisdiction, 1961 CONF. CHIEF JUSTICES 28, 35).
120. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 180-81; see also Atwood, supra note 117, at 378 (noting that
the law “fairly invited kidnapping”). 
121. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181 (noting that Sen. Malcolm Wallop invoked this figure in
the legislative hearings that preceded the enactment of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act); SANFORD N. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF
CHILDREN 11 (1981) (noting that the number could be higher, given that “parents who abduct
their children do not advertise that information”). 
122. Bodenheimer, supra note 114, at 1216-17.
123. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 2(5), 9(IA) U.L.A. 286 (1999) [hereinafter
UCCJA].
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acting as parent, for at least 6 consecutive months.”124 Alternatively,
a court might exercise jurisdiction if it was located in a state that
had a “significant connection” to the child and at least one of the
child’s parents, and the state was the site of “substantial evidence
concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training,
and personal relationships.”125 Two additional provisions authorized
a court to take jurisdiction in emergency circumstances126 or
situations in which no state satisfied the parameters set forth in the
preceding three alternatives and the court deemed it in the best
interests of the child to assume jurisdiction.127 Congress in turn
enacted the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, which provided
standards for the interstate recognition and enforcement of custody
decrees that had been properly issued by a court with adequate
jurisdiction.128
The UCCJA was adopted by every state, although with variations
that undermined the goal of national uniformity in child custody
jurisdiction.129 Nonetheless, it “marked an improvement over the
124. Id. §§ 2(5), 3(a)(1), 9(IA) U.L.A. at 286, 307. The definition specified that in the case
of a child who was less than six months old, the home state would be “the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.” Id. § 2(5), 9(IA) U.L.A. at 286.
Home state jurisdiction was not necessarily defeated by the child’s departure from the state.
See id. § 3(a)(1)(ii), 9(IA) U.L.A. at 307. If a parent remained in the home state, home state
jurisdiction would persist for another six months, as long as the child’s removal took place
within the six months prior to the jurisdiction determination and was caused by a parent
contesting custody, or the child was removed from the home state “for other reasons.” See id. 
125. Id. § 3(a)(2), 9(IA) U.L.A. at 307.
126. Emergency jurisdiction was authorized where the child was physically present in the
state and had been abandoned or “subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or
is otherwise neglected [or dependent].” Id. § 3(a)(3), 9(IA) U.L.A. at 307. 
127. The jurisdiction granted under this catchall or default jurisdiction included states that
had been specifically identified as a superior forum to determine child custody by a state that
had declined jurisdiction for that very reason. Id. § 3(a)(4)(I), 9(IA) U.L.A. at 307-08. 
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006). As one authority explains:
The PKPA does not dictate the terms for exercising initial custody jurisdiction
nor does it prohibit states from recognizing decrees that do not conform to the
PKPA. Rather, it sets out criteria which, if complied with, will result in a
custody decree that must be afforded full faith and credit.
GREGORY ET AL., supra note 111, § 11.02(1), at 511.
129. In addition to these discrepancies, the UCCJA suffered from a complicated
intersection with the PKPA. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT,
prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 650 (1997) (describing the relationship between the two statutes as
“technical enough to delight a medieval property lawyer”) (quoting HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 12.5, at 494 (2d ed. 1988)). 
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traditional, domicile-based approach to custody jurisdiction.”130
Perhaps its most significant contribution was to treat the child’s
physical presence as a condition that was neither necessary nor
sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction, counteracting at least in
part the kidnapping incentives that had permeated the traditional
approach.131 It left plenty of room for interstate custody disputes,
however, and the litigation that ensued revealed that the UCCJA
had not done enough to constrain the discretion of judges deciding
whether to take jurisdiction.
Take, for example, Chaddick v. Monopoli, an interstate custody
dispute spanning ten years and three states and presenting exactly
the sort of jurisdictional controversy the UCCJA was designed to
alleviate.132 The couple divorced in Massachusetts, and the mother
was awarded custody of the couple’s two children. Pursuant to the
order, the father was to have visitation every summer. The mother
and the children then moved to Florida, while the father moved to
Virginia. In 1993, five years after the divorce, the mother sent the
children to Virginia for visitation with their father during July and
August. Instead of returning the children on August 6 as he had
promised to do, the father kept the children and filed a petition in
Virginia court to obtain custody. He alleged that he did not have the
mother’s current address and had been unsuccessful in his attempts
to obtain it from her, that the airline would not permit the children
to travel without the current address, and that the mother “was
pregnant and living with a man to whom she was not married.”133
The Virginia court assumed jurisdiction, presumably finding the
state of Virginia to have a “significant connection” with the child-
ren,134 and the very same month issued an order transferring
130. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 111, § 11.02(C), at 510.
131. The Reporter for the NCCUSL Committee that drafted the UCCJA observes that
“[t]he basic notion underlying the Act—that jurisdiction be limited to those states which have
maximum access to the relevant facts—implicitly excludes jurisdiction when the child and
custody claimant are merely physically present without any durable ties with the state.”
Bodenheimer, supra note 114, at 1227-28. 
132. See Chaddick v. Monopoli, 714 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. 1998). 
133. Id.
134. The Florida District Court of Appeal entertained the possibility that the Virginia court
may have deemed the situation an emergency because of the mother’s address. See Chaddick,
677 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Harris, J., concurring), approved in part,
disapproved in part, 714 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1998). But to characterize that as tantamount to
abandonment, or that it was therefore “necessary ... to protect the child because he ha[d] been
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custody to the father.135 The mother hired local counsel and
appeared in Virginia to contest jurisdiction, becoming enmeshed in
out-of-state proceedings that would persist for more than a year and
a half. In March 1995, the Virginia court ruled against the mother
both as to the jurisdictional issues and as to custody itself.136
When the mother filed suit the next month in Florida, challenging
the Virginia court’s authority to issue the modification and request-
ing enforcement of the original Massachusetts decree, the Florida
courts refused to consider whether Virginia had properly exercised
jurisdiction, treating the mother as the litigant in search of the
proverbial second bite of the apple.137 The mother’s efforts to contest
the jurisdiction of the Virginia court weighed heavily against her.
The Florida courts treated as a damning admission the statement
in her brief that she “cooperated and fully participated in the court
proceedings in Virginia in an attempt to rectify the injustice which
has occurred, but all efforts in that jurisdiction have failed.”138
Against this backdrop, the Florida Supreme Court characterized the
mother as “seeking to have the Florida court overrule the Virginia
court’s determination of jurisdiction and to reconsider the Virginia
court’s determination of custody.”139 It held that doing so would
contravene the UCCJA: “Such conduct is clearly contrary to the
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or [was] otherwise neglected,” UCCJA
§6 3(a)(3), 9(IA) U.L.A. 307 (1999), is farfetched.
135. Chaddick, 714 So. 2d at 1008. 
136. Id.
137. The Florida District Court of Appeal explained:
If the mother wished to challenge the authority of the Virginia courts to hear
this issue without submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the Virginia courts,
she should have filed her petition to domesticate and enforce the Massachusetts
judgment in Florida. Then the assigned judges, pursuant to the UCCJA, would
determine which state should proceed. Indeed that is a primary function of the
UCCJA. In our case, the mother did not come to the Florida courts until the
Virginia court had not only, with her full participation, ruled on the issue of
jurisdiction but also had awarded custody of the children to the father. This was
too late .... [She had her] bite of the apple.
Id. at 1008, 1011 (quoting Chaddick, 667 So. 2d at 349-50).
138. Id. at 1008. As the dissent noted, the mother “has been punished for attempting to
convince the foreign court that it was not the appropriate forum to decide this dispute.
Presumably, under the majority opinion she should have ignored the Virginia courts and
rushed right into court in Florida. Her decision not to do so has proven fatal.” Id. at 1016
(Anstead, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. at 1010.
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basic philosophy of the UCCJA and requires the type of relitigation
that the UCCJA was intended to prevent.”140
 The court’s emphasis on its obligations under the UCCJA is both
perplexing and yet revealing of the UCCJA’s limitations. Virginia,
acquiescing to the father’s choice of forum, assumed jurisdiction in
spite of the facts that (1) Massachusetts was the state that issued
the original custody order and (2) Florida was the children’s home
state at the time the father filed the modification petition. The
children had lived in Florida with their primary caretaker for two
years, well beyond the statutory period that gives rise to home state
jurisdiction. The children attended school in Florida and spent only
brief periods of their summer vacation in Virginia,141 hardly enough
to make Virginia the site of the most relevant evidence about the
children and their “care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships.”142
How is it possible that the UCCJA, designed to improve the
jurisdictional frameworks that govern where a child custody dispute
should take place, could be read to countenance, much less require,
this result? Dissenting judges on both the intermediate appellate
court and the Florida Supreme Court raised some very convincing
arguments that the UCCJA did not counsel this outcome.143 But the
UCCJA was plagued with weaknesses that arguably allowed such
140. Id. at 1010-11. The Florida courts noted that the UCCJA, adopted in both Florida and
Virginia, prohibited the courts of one state from exercising jurisdiction over a custody petition
if “a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of another state
exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act.” Id. at 1009 (quoting UCCJA
§ 6, 9(IA) U.L.A. 474 (1999)). From the mother’s point of view, whether the Virginia court had
acted “substantially in conformity with the act” was exactly the question that she was asking
the Florida courts to determine. 
141. The father moved to Virginia sometime between 1991 and July 1993, so at most the
children would have had two summer visits in Virginia prior to the one that culminated in the
modification dispute. Chaddick, 677 So. 2d at 351 (Sharp, J., dissenting). 
142. One of the stated purposes of the UCCJA is to:
assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in
the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and
where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and
personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state
decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer
connection with another state.
UCCJA § 1(a)(3), 9(IA) U.L.A. 271 (1999).
143. See Chaddick, 714 So. 2d at 1013-14 (Anstead, J., dissenting); Chaddick, 677 So. 2d
at 350-51 (W. Sharp, J., dissenting).
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a result, permitting Virginia to declare itself an appropriate forum
on “significant connection” grounds in spite of another state’s
superior relationship with the children in question. Virginia’s
exercise of the discretion afforded to it—which then became binding
and preclusive on other states—rewarded the father’s race to his
preferred courthouse, which began with him retaining the children
beyond the time they were to return to their custodial parent.144
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws addressed these and other shortcomings when it revised the
Act in 1997, issuing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).145 The UCCJEA improves upon the
UCCJA by ordering the various jurisdictional bases in a hierarchy,
rather than treating them as equally available alternatives from
which a court could select one or another at its own discretion.146
Under the UCCJEA, a court assessing whether it has jurisdiction
over a child custody matter is directed first to determine the child’s
home state, if one exists.147 The home state is given an unambigu-
ous, mandatory priority above all other modes of exercising
jurisdiction. Only if there is no court with home state jurisdiction,
or the home state court has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
grounds that another, specifically identified state is the more
appropriate forum, may a court exercise jurisdiction on the basis
that it has a significant connection with the child and is the site of
144. As the dissent noted, this is just a slight variation on seize and run. See Chaddick, 714
So. 2d at 1014 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
145. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9(IA) U.L.A. 655 (1999)
[hereinafter UCCJEA]. Every state except Massachusetts has adopted the UCCJEA. Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniform
laws.org/Act.aspx?title=Child+Custody+Jurisdiction+and+Enforcement+Act (last visited Mar.
31, 2014); see Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:
Numbers of Disputes Increase, 45 FAM. L.Q. 443, 450 (2012).
146. See UCCJEA § 201, 9(IA) U.L.A. at 671.
147. Id. A child may have moved too frequently, or too close in time to the initiation of the
proceeding, to have a home state. See id. For an illustration, see AREEN & REGAN, supra note
82, at 664. Their example is as follows:
Jane lives with her mother and father in Ohio for five years. Her parents split
up and she and her mother move to Wisconsin for four months, Indiana for three
months and Florida for three months. Jane’s mother has a job in Florida and
Jane has enrolled in school there and is taking dance classes after school. Jane’s
father continues to live in Ohio. No state court in this instance is authorized to
exercise home state jurisdiction, because Jane has been gone from Ohio for more
than six months and has not lived in another state for six months.
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substantial evidence regarding the child’s care and relationships.148
Although default jurisdiction remains much the same as it had
appeared in the UCCJA, the NCCUSL reworked emergency
jurisdiction to emphasize its extraordinary nature and disfavored
status.149 It continues to authorize a court to take jurisdiction when
the child is present in the state and has either been abandoned or
is facing mistreatment or abuse.150 It also allows for emergency
jurisdiction when necessary to protect the child in the event that the
child’s sibling or parent is subjected to or threatened with mistreat-
ment or abuse, a significant protection for children whose welfare
is threatened by family violence.151 But anything the court does
pursuant to its emergency jurisdiction is merely temporary.152 No
longer can emergency jurisdiction be used as a hook to confer full
dispositional authority on a court that, but for the emergent
circumstances, would lack jurisdiction.
These changes—a subset of the many improvements reflected in
the UCCJEA153—do much more than simply clarify gaps and
ambiguities in the previous Act. The tritate dispute discussed above,
Chaddick v. Monopoli, illustrates the significance of these revisions:
the jurisdictional outcome would have been different under the
UCCJEA. Given Florida’s indisputable status as the children’s home
state, Virginia would not have been permitted to exercise significant
connection jurisdiction. To the extent that the Virginia court was
148. To be clear, if there is a home state but the home state has declined jurisdiction on the
grounds that another state is the superior forum, only a court in the state specified by the
home state may exercise “significant connection” jurisdiction. UCCJEA § 201(a)(2), 9(IA)
U.L.A. at 671. 
149. In the UCCJA, the emergency jurisdiction provision was found in the same section of
the Act as the other bases for exercising jurisdiction. § 3(a)(3), 9(IA) U.L.A. 307 (1999). In the
UCCJEA, the NCCUSL removed it from the section that sets forth the bases for exercising
initial child custody jurisdiction and gave it its own section, entitled “Temporary Emergency
Jurisdiction.” § 204, 9(IA) U.L.A. at 676-77. 
150. UCCJEA § 204(a), 9(IA) U.L.A. at 676. 
151. Id. 
152. See id. § 204(b)-(d), 9(IA) U.L.A. at 676-77. 
153. The changes are more extensive than this Article summarizes here. For a side-by-side
comparison of the two Acts, see Ron W. Nelson, The UCCJA and the UCCJEA: A Side-by-Side
Comparison, 10 DIVORCE LITIG. 233 (1998); see also Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC’s of the
UCCJEA: Interstate Child-Custody Practice Under the New Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 267 (1998). For
a discussion of the ways in which the UCCJEA might yet still be improved, see David H. Levy
& Nanette McCarthy, A Critique of the Proposed Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 149 (1998). 
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exercising emergency jurisdiction predicated on the father’s inability
to obtain the mother’s current address, such jurisdiction would have
been temporary and would not have authorized the modification
ruling. By mandating that the modification dispute be litigated in
Florida, the state with the most substantial relationship to the
children and their primary caregiver, the UCCJEA would have
compelled a normatively superior result, one that is closer to the
purposes served by uniform jurisdictional rules.154 To effectuate
these purposes, it was not enough to limit the grounds on which
jurisdiction could be exercised, as the UCCJA had done. It was
necessary to create a jurisdictional hierarchy, prioritizing the most
determinate means of exercising jurisdiction and eliminating the
discretion to pursue a more subjective, indeterminate, and thus
unpredictable inquiry.155
C. Child Support
The transformation from judicial discretion to determinate rules
has already taken place in the law governing child support.156 The
previous generation of child support statutes offered little more
predictability or certainty than the best-interests standard used for
child custody.157 The provision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act governing child support is illustrative, instructing courts to
order:
either or both parents ... to pay an amount reasonable or
necessary for [the child’s] support ... after considering all
relevant factors including: (1) the financial resources of the
child; (2) the financial resources of the custodial parent; (3) the
standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the
marriage not been dissolved; (4) the physical and emotional
154. See supra note 142. 
155. Every state except Massachusetts has adopted the UCCJEA. See Elrod & Spector,
supra note 145, at 450; cf. Appleton, supra note 2, at 47-48 (discussing the Uniform Adoption
Act, which prescribes the jurisdictional inquiry for adoption cases).
156. See Ira Mark Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct
Child Support Guidelines, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 167.
157. See JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 653 (1978) (“Statutes which
authorize courts to award child support tend to be written in so general a fashion as to leave
judges almost total discretion in the matter.”). 
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condition of the child and his educational needs; and (5) the
financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.158
This kind of flexibility resulted in awards that were not only
wildly inconsistent across the similarly situated,159 but also all too
often inadequate, contributing to “spiraling poverty rate[s] among
women and children.”160 Finding that the poverty attributable to
inadequate child support awards was a matter of national concern,
Congress responded with legislation that required states to develop
quantitative formulae for child support awards as a condition of
receiving certain federal funds.161 Every state has since abandoned
the “all relevant factors including” approach in favor of fixed rules
for calculating child support.162
The formulae that resulted are hardly impervious to criticism; in
fact, the methodology used to develop the child support rules has
been described as “theoretically suspect and empirically unverifi-
able.”163 Professor Katharine Baker goes further, demonstrating
that fixed rules or formulae are not merely less sensitive to context
than open-ended standards, but are in fact “mostly arbitrary.”164 She
nonetheless argues quite persuasively why we must accept such
arbitrariness, asking us to imagine a world in which a court issuing
a child support order would endeavor to address the following:
158. UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (1973). 
159. As one scholar discusses:
[O]ne study found that in a district court in Denver, the support that judges
ordered in single-child families ranged from six percent to thirty-three percent
of the obligor’s income. In another study, a random sampling of cases revealed
that fathers earning $155.00 per week had to pay anywhere from ten dollars to
sixty dollars per week for one child, depending on the judge.
Murphy, supra note 16, at 227 (footnotes omitted).
160. Id. at 226-27. 
161. The Congressional response came in stages, each time providing for the further
reduction of judicial discretion. See, e.g., AREEN & REGAN, supra note 82, at 782; Charlotte L.
Allen, Federalization of Child Support: Twenty Years and Counting, 73 MICH. B.J. 660, 660-61
(1994).
162. See Ellman, supra note 156, at 169-70.
163. Id. at 168; see also Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous
Families: The Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 319, 340-42.
164. Baker, supra note 163, at 361.
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Has an adult developed a sufficiently important relationship
with a child for that relationship to warrant the imposition of
obligation? Whose views about the relationship should count?
The child’s? The potential obligor’s? A current obligor who may
know nothing about the potential obligor, but has much to gain
from someone else being obligated? How should a judge allocate
responsibilities between obligors? What if one obligor already
has outstanding duties to another set of children? Should the
formalization of the parental obligation to either set of children
matter or just the reliance of the children? What about the
reliance of another parent? How many other parents? When is
such reliance reasonable? What if one set of children finds a new
source of support, who should enjoy the windfall of that new
support, the children or the obligor? Should the obligor’s income,
parenting philosophy, or intent to parent be at all relevant?165
Noting that “[t]hese are very messy questions,” Professor Baker
concludes that “[a] parent and/or child eager to secure and keep
resources flowing might strongly resent how much time it would
take to answer the questions, how invasive the process of answering
would be, and how many resources the whole process would
drain.”166 Baker’s critique is particularly powerful for our purposes
because it illustrates that the benefits of a determinate approach
accrue not merely in spite of, but because of, the limitations that are
placed on the decision-making process.
Studies comparing the fixed-rule regime to its predecessor sug-
gest that the former has achieved higher awards167 as well as more
consistency across awards,168 allows parties and their attorneys to
predict with much more accuracy the amount of support ordered,169
and has reduced the time and expense of child support litigation.170
As one author asserts, “The consensus emerging from the studies
and the stories is that child support guidelines are working. The
guidelines seem to realize the virtues of having rules that fix, with
165. Id. at 362.
166. Id.
167. Murphy, supra note 16, at 238-40. 
168. Id. at 233.
169. Id. at 234.
170. See id. at 237.
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more certainty than before, the parameters of parents’ responsibility
to support their children.”171
D. Synthesizing the Trend Toward Determinate Rules
The judgments being made in each of the preceding contexts are,
of course, very different from one another, as are the legal develop-
ments taking place in each, and it would be a mistake to over-
generalize or overstate what they all have in common.172 But with
that caution in mind, it is fair to say that these examples illustrate
an emerging recognition that families are not necessarily best
served by infinitely individualized decision making. In fact, as
Baker’s work on child support illustrates so beautifully, infinitely
individualized decision making places enormous procedural burdens
on precisely the individuals the law is designed to serve.173
Nonetheless, increasing the “ruleness” of legal frameworks always
comes at a cost to flexibility and sensitivity to context,174 and we can
readily see why lawmakers might be particularly hesitant to accept
these costs in family law, where advancing the goals of postdis-
solution child welfare or economic stability seems difficult to achieve
by means of standardization. But even in these areas, lawmakers
and scholars are recognizing that these costs are sometimes
warranted: that the predictability and certainty that come from
fixed rules can do more to further family welfare than the sensitiv-
ity to context that comes from an unconstrained decision maker.175
In tension with these developments is a competing trend: in
another area of family law we are seeing a move toward more
flexible and more individualized decision making that eschews
reliance on formal legal status in favor of functional assessments of
171. Id. at 232; see also Ellman, supra note 16, at 858 (characterizing child support as “an
example ... of the willingness to sacrifice the decision maker’s discretion to craft customized
justice in each individual case, in order to achieve a larger benefit over the full run of cases”).
172. It would, however, also be a mistake to assume that child support is more amenable
to fixed rules simply because it involves financial calculations. As one scholar has noted,
ascertaining the cost of raising children involves “quintessentially subjective value judgments”
that “cannot be determined neutrally. What kind and how much food, clothing, enrichment,
education, and recreation does a child need, deserve, or benefit from? Millions of parents
answer these questions differently every day.” Baker, supra note 163, at 330. 
173. See supra text accompanying note 166.
174. See Ellman, supra note 16, at 859.
175. See id. at 871.
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the relationships in question. I examine this phenomenon in the
following Part.
III. FAMILY LAW’S FUNCTIONAL TURN
The legal frameworks discussed above, which indicate a trend
toward determinate rules, generally apply to disputes between two
people both recognized as the legal parents of the children in
question.176 But when it comes to determining who the law should
treat as a parent in the first place, a different trend emerges. Here
we see movement away from a formalist, rule-based regime to one
that affords flexibility, discretion, and sensitivity to context. In this
Part, I describe the traditional formalist approach to legal parent-
age and the emerging functionalist response.
A. Understanding Traditional Parentage
The determination of a child’s parentage was traditionally an
inquiry governed by determinate rules, the application of which
yielded legally clear—though still normatively contestable—answers
about which individuals enjoyed formal legal status as a parent.177
The woman who gave birth to a child was identified as the child’s
mother, and her husband was presumed, often conclusively, to be
the child’s father.178 Professor Susan Frelich Appleton illuminates
the practical significance of the presumption: “Whether he is
genetically related or not, the presumption makes the mother’s
husband automatically and immediately a full-fledged legal parent,
176. This is definitely true for child custody disputes in which the court applies the best-
interests standard, the modification of orders arising from those contests, and child support
proceedings. The UCCJEA, however, applies both to disputes between two legal parents and
disputes that involve a person “acting as a parent.” See UCCJEA § 201, 9(IA) U.L.A. 671
(1997). 
177. See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental
Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 318
(2007).
178. Id. at 309-10; Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the
Paternity of Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55, 55-56 & n.2 (2003). The scheme was not
merely biologically determinate, as the marital parentage presumption conferred legal
fatherhood on husbands to the exclusion of the known biological fathers. See, e.g., Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
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without the need for any additional state intervention.”179 When the
birth mother was unmarried, she was the sole legal parent of her
child.180 Legal parenthood, conferred automatically via these bio-
logical and marital-based defaults, was occasionally transferred to
adoptive parents via judicial proceedings, bestowing upon them the
full complement of parental rights and responsibilities.181
To understand the implications of these rules that identify who
is a legal parent, we need to explore in more detail what it means to
be deemed a parent in the eyes of the law. Formal legal status as a
parent has been an enormously powerful construct. It has tradition-
ally been an exclusive status, afforded to at most two people,182 and
it has, for the most part, reflected a binary quality—one is either a
legal parent or a legal stranger to any given child.183 With certain
carefully circumscribed exceptions, one’s relationship with a child
has traditionally been given either the full range of protection
afforded to legally recognized parents or none at all, leaving the
relationship entirely vulnerable to the consent of the child’s parent
or parents.184
The central elements of the traditional parentage regime are still
in place, both as to what it means to be a legal parent and how the
179. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy
in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 233 (2006). Appleton makes the point
particularly clear by contrasting this with other methods of becoming legally recognized as
a father, which entail considerable state regulation, the passage of time, or both, and in some
cases are available only upon family dissolution. Id. 
180. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 207 (1985). Historically, however, the maternal ties were weaker. MARY
ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD
CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (1994). 
181. For a history of adoption in the United States, see Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes
or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077 (2003).
182. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
879 (1984); Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the
Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 506 (1998).
183. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 177, at 314 (“The dichotomy between the rights of parents
and nonparents is well established in American jurisprudence.”); Julie Shapiro, De Facto
Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALI Principles, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769,
770-71 (1999) (“The law utilizes dualistic categories, such as ‘parent’ versus ‘nonpar-
ent’—which, in law, may be the same as ‘stranger’—to identify those who hold legally
recognized and enforceable rights or obligations and to separate them from those who have
no rights or obligations.”).
184. See Shapiro, supra note 183, at 770-73.
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law identifies one as such.185 The binary and exclusive nature of
legal parenthood is expressed and enforced through special gate-
keeping statutes that delineate when an individual who is not a
legal parent may initiate or participate in a child custody proceeding
in which a court will allocate parental rights and responsibilities.
Although some states allow fairly unrestricted access,186 most
require petitioners to satisfy specific conditions that reflect the
legislature’s judgment about which situations warrant interference
with a parent’s decision making.187 For some states, the key inquiry
is whether the petitioner is a relative of the child in question; nearly
every state allows grandparents to seek visitation in some form,
although some require the grandparent to first demonstrate that
there is a custody case currently pending or that there has been a
disruptive event in the family, such as a death or a divorce.188 Other
states allow nonparents to initiate child custody proceedings only if
they have existing caretaker relationships with the child in
question. In Colorado, for example, a nonparent may initiate a child
custody proceeding only if the child has been in her physical care for
at least six months and she files the petition within six months of
the end of the period of physical care.189 The Texas statute reflects
an even more restrictive version of this approach, requiring a
nonparent to show that he “has had actual care, control, and pos-
session of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90
days preceding the date of the filing of the petition.”190
185. But see June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of
Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295 (2005) (noting increasing uncertainty in the legal
definition of parenthood).
186. Washington is one example, although the Supreme Court has deemed an application
of this statute to be unconstitutional in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
187. See Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek
Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 8, 18 (2013).
188. Id. at 29; Josh Gupta-Kagan, Children, Kin, and Court: Designing Third Party
Custody Policy to Protect Children, Third Parties, and Parents, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 43, 75 (2008). The key difference here is between those states that permit a
grandparent to initiate a proceeding and those that simply permit a grandparent to seek
visitation within the context of an existing proceeding. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-
117 (2013) (permitting only the latter), limited by In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 (Colo.
2006).
189. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (2013).
190. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (2013). The Texas courts have interpreted this
provision to require some degree of control beyond that inherent in caretaking, and have
denied standing to petitioners with long-standing caretaking relationships who were unable
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Although these are often referred to as questions of “standing,”
the reference to trans-substantive justiciability doctrines is mis-
leading; these statutes close the family court door to a great many
individuals who would easily meet the federal courts’ tripartite
requirement of injury, causation, and redressability.191 The statutes
that govern “standing” in family law do considerably more than
ensure that courts are adjudicating disputes between litigants who
have a sufficiently personal and concrete stake in the outcome.192
They operate as a significant procedural and substantive entitle-
ment for the legally recognized parent: except in carefully circum-
scribed situations, parents do not have to answer to nonparents. The
right to exclude is at the heart of the law’s package of parental
rights, as surely as the obligation to provide support is at the heart
of the law’s package of parental responsibilities. Standing in family
law is therefore an expression of the view that the parental
prerogative is not only to have the ultimate authority regarding the
child in question but to be free of the obligation to explain or defend
such decisions.
This prerogative continues to be conferred largely through the
biological and marital-based default rules summarized above. The
woman who gives birth to a child continues to be automatically
to show that they enjoyed some sort of “power or authority to guide and manage, and ... to
make decisions of legal significance for the child.” In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788, 793 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2009). Even when a co-parent was able to point to a written agreement to share custody
after the couple’s separation, the court insisted that she had not established the requisite
control because the biological mother had not relinquished or “ceded ... any of her exclusive
legal rights to control” the child. In re Wells, 373 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012). This drains
the provision of much of its significance, because if it allows standing only when a legal parent
has relinquished rights to the child, it offers no avenue for a co-parent to assert that he or she
should be deemed to share those legal rights.
191. Constitutional principles reinforce the exclusive and binary nature of legal
parenthood; the Supreme Court has held that a parent’s constitutionally protected right to
the care, custody, and control of her child barred the application of a state statute permitting
anyone to petition for visitation at any time. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
192. This is, of course, a simplified view of standing as a trans-substantive justiciability
doctrine that restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts and, to a lesser extent, state courts.
I use this simplified view to draw the contrast to “standing” as it operates in the domestic
relations context. I do not mean to diminish the substantial obstacles that standing poses to
many plaintiffs or to endorse the federal courts’ standing doctrine, which has been rightly
criticized as incoherent and politically motivated. For some of this criticism, see F. Andrew
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 276 n.3 (2008)
(noting this body of literature and collecting sources).
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recognized as the child’s legal mother.193 And although many juris-
dictions have weakened its force,194 the marital parentage presump-
tion is present in some form in every state,195 proving more tena-
cious than the requirement that there be one man and one woman
to compose a valid marriage.196 Nonetheless, while biology and
marriage continue to be preeminent in the law’s assignment of
parental status, as scholars have observed, a “contemporary
emphasis on behavior and function” is increasingly pronounced in
the way courts are handling difficult parentage disputes.197
B. The Tension Between Formal Parentage and Functional             
     Parenthood
One can see the divide between the old formalism and the new
functionalism most dramatically in the ever-growing set of custody
disputes between people who do not fit the mold of a married,
193. See Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for
Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 671, 674 (2012) (“In every state, a
woman who gives birth to a child—outside of an enforceable surrogacy agreement—is the
legal mother of that child. A single woman who adopts a child has a similarly invulnerable,
legal parent-child relationship with the adopted child.”). 
194. See Appleton, supra note 179, at 234-36. For an illuminating discussion of why the
marital presumption is no longer as effective in securing legal paternity as it once was, see
Carbone, supra note 185. 
195. See Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgements of Parentage for Same-Sex
Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 467 (2012) (“The law in all states presumes
that a husband is the father of his wife’s children and gives him the status of the children’s
legal father.”). 
196. There are currently more states that permit same-sex marriage—as this goes to print,
seventeen plus the District of Columbia—than have abandoned the marital parentage
presumption. See Defining Marriage: State Defense of Marriage Laws and Same-Sex Marriage,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-
services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx. The number may very well grow. Federal courts
in two additional states, Utah and Oklahoma, have struck down bans on same-sex marriage;
those orders have been stayed pending appeal and are thus not included in the above count.
With more than forty cases currently pending in state and federal courts raising the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans, the accuracy of such a tally is necessarily
short-lived. See Juliet Eilperin, Judge Rules Oklahoma Same-Sex Marriage Ban Is
Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judge-
rules-oklahoma-same-sex-marriage-ban-is-unconstitutional/2014/01/14/2729f2b4-7d73-11e3-
95c6-0a7aa80874bc_story.html.
197. Appleton, supra note 2, at 26; see also Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 55 (2007) (“[T]he law is slowly but surely moving toward a
functional definition of parenthood.”).
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heterosexual couple who are both biologically related to the children
in question.198 Prominent among these are same-sex couples who
have raised children together, sharing fully and equally in care-
taking duties.199 Often one parent has a biological or adoptive
connection to the child, whereas the other does not.200 Some states
now issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples or recognize civil
unions or domestic partnerships with nearly all the rights and
responsibilities of marriage; by one count, sixteen such jurisdictions
have thereby extended the marital parentage presumption to same-
sex couples who formalize their relationships.201 But for those who
decided to have children before these developments,202 or who live
in jurisdictions that continue to exclude same-sex couples from the
rights and responsibilities of marriage, or for couples who have not
formalized their relationship for other reasons, the law lacks a
determinate mechanism for conferring parental rights on individu-
als who do not enjoy the status that attends a biological or adoptive
198. As Pamela Laufer-Ukeles and Ayelet Blecher-Prigat have explained, the issue of
functional parenthood can arise in a range of different contexts, including “open adoption;
homosexual relationships; stepparent and cohabitant relations; grandparent [and other]
extended familial relationships; assisted reproduction with multiple parents; and foster
parent relationships.” Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and
Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419,
423-24 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
199. For other examples, see C.M. v. P.R., 649 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1995); Multari v. Sorrell,
731 N.Y.S.2d 238 (App. Div. 2001); Sean H. v. Leila H., 783 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 2004); In
re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009). 
200. Some states allow second parent adoption, a mechanism that allows a co-parent to
adopt her partner’s child as long as the legal mother consents and joins the adoption petition.
See Grossman, supra note 193, at 674. One authority identifies eighteen states plus the
District of Columbia that allow second-parent adoption by statute or appellate court decision
and notes that in another twelve states trial courts have granted second-parent adoptions. See
COURTNEY JOSLIN & SHANNON MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY
LAW § 5:3 (2012). For further explanation and critique of second-parent adoptions, see Nancy
D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children
of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 207 (2009) (“Even
where second-parent adoption is available today, the couple must hire a lawyer and
participate in what can be both a lengthy and expensive legal process.”); Julie Shapiro, A
Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 17 (1999). 
201. Harris, supra note 195, at 467. 
202. This assumes that the marital parentage presumption would not operate retroactively
when a child was conceived or born before the beginning of the marriage. See, e.g., 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5 (2013) (“A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if: (1)
he and the child’s natural mother are or have been married to each other ... and the child is
born or conceived during such marriage.”). 
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connection. In the all-or-nothing world of parental rights, such
individuals can be left with no recourse in the event that the legal
parent decides to cut off contact between her children and her
former partner. Courts following the traditional approach treat
these “former partner parents” as legal strangers, in spite of
overwhelming evidence that the couples both intended to, and did
in fact, raise children jointly as co-parents.
In one such dispute, former partners Michelle and Leslea White
had each conceived and given birth to a biologically related child via
artificial insemination, using the same anonymous sperm donor.203
The couple separated approximately a year and a half after the
younger child was born, and for about six months, the children lived
with one parent part of the time and the other parent part of the
time.204 Michelle, the biological mother of C.E.W., then refused to
allow Leslea to have any contact with C.E.W. or to contribute to
C.E.W.’s support.205 At the risk of making the unseemly suggestion
that a parent in Leslea’s situation would leverage her own parental
rights in a retaliatory fashion, one might think that Michelle’s
interest in her relationship with Leslea’s biological child would
inspire collaborative behavior with reciprocal expectations. Instead,
Michelle stopped seeking contact with Leslea’s biological child or
contributing to his support and refused to allow the siblings to see
each other.206 In short, she severed the relationship between two
siblings, between herself and an almost two-year-old child she
raised from birth as a co-parent, and between her biological three-
year-old child and a person the child had known as a parent since
birth.207
Surely, whatever else we might expect from a family law regime,
a tolerably effective one would impose some backstop on this kind
of conduct. According to the Missouri Court of Appeals, however,
there was not a single statutory provision or equitable principle that
Leslea, as a legal stranger to C.E.W., could invoke to call upon the
assistance of the state; Leslea did not even have standing to initiate
203. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). “The sperm donor waived all
parental rights to both children.” Id. at 6 n.1.
204. Id. at 6.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id.
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a proceeding in which the court could evaluate her relationship with
C.E.W. in any sort of qualitative fashion.208 In other words, Mis-
souri’s family law framework, as the court understood it, conferred
upon Michelle an absolute right to behave in this way, imposing
upon her no obligation to submit to a determination of the impact
on the children.209 This kind of formalism garners few defenders.210
For courts following the traditional approach, even the existence
of unambiguous co-parenting agreements offers no protection to a
functional parent when the legal parent has denied contact with her
children.211 After eight years of living together, Mary Wakeman and
208. See id. at 25 (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Leslea’s petition for lack of
standing and failure to state a claim).
209. See id.
210. See Schauer, supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that in spite of scholarly
disagreement over the exact meaning of formalism, there is consensus that “whatever
formalism is, it is not good”). Notwithstanding Schauer’s wry observation, this particular
brand of formalism does in fact have a few proponents: typically, conservative individuals
and organizations that resist the expansion of recognized family forms beyond the hetero-
sexual couple and their biologically related children. See, e.g., William C. Duncan,
Deconstructing Parenthood, 22 THE FAMILY IN AMERICA, Oct.-Dec. 2008, at 8, available at
www.profam.org/pub/fia/fia.2204.htm; William C. Duncan, The Legal Fiction of De Facto
Parenthood, 36 J. LEGIS. 263 (2010).
Duncan is the director of the Marriage Law Foundation, an organization that describes its
mission as one of “reaffirming the legal definition of marriage as the union of a husband and
wife.” About the Foundation, MARRIAGE L. FOUND., http://www.marriagelawfoundation.org/
board.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). Although these organizations consistently deploy
rhetoric that emphasizes the welfare of children, they apparently believe that this objective
would be advanced by allowing a legal parent to terminate all contact between a child and
someone who had functioned as a parent since the child’s birth. In one parentage and custody
dispute between two former partners who had formalized their relationship under Vermont’s
civil union law, an organization opposed to the recognition of same-sex couples in Vermont
raised money to support the biological mother’s efforts to repudiate her former partner’s
parental status. See Appleton, supra note 179, at 251. The biological mother was represented
by lawyers from Liberty University, an evangelical institution, throughout legal proceedings
that lasted seven years due to her repeated refusal to comply with court orders granting
visitation to her former partner. Erik Eckholm, Pastor Is Accused of Helping to Kidnap Girl
at Center of Lesbian Custody Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2011, at 16N. The collaboration
between the biological mother and her conservative evangelical supporters eventually took
a criminal turn, as the woman’s pastor helped her kidnap the child and travel to Canada,
Mexico, and then Nicaragua in an effort to evade authorities. Id. To the extent that these
same proponents have railed against the shortcomings of single parenthood, there is some
irony in the fact that the denial of parental status to former partner parents leaves the vast
majority of the children in question with one rather than two parents. See, e.g., White, 293
S.W.3d 1, 6-7, 25 (6 Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
211. Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see also Curiale v.
Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990) (denying co-parent standing to assert a claim for
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Dene Dixon entered into an agreement with a sperm donor, in which
he relinquished parental rights and agreed that the two women
would be the “co-parents” for any child conceived through the sperm
donation.212 The same agreement specified that Wakeman would be
the co-parent of any children born to Dixon and that Dixon would be
the co-parent of any children born to Wakeman.213 Dixon became
pregnant as a result of the sperm donation.214 After the child was
born in May 1999:
Dixon and Wakeman entered into another agreement in which
each party acknowledged that the decision to conceive the child
was a ‘joint decision’ which was based on the commitment of
each to ‘jointly parent the child.’ In this agreement ... Wakeman
agreed to contribute to the financial support of the child and
both parties indicated their intent to ‘equally share in providing
the child’ with the necessary support until [the age of]
majority.215
The document also reflected their agreement that Wakeman is “a
de facto parent who has participated in all phases of pre-natal care,
and who plans to provide [the child] with a stable environment and
psychological parenting relationship ... [that] should be protected
and promoted to preserve the strong emotional tie that will develop
between them.”216 Perhaps most notably, the agreement provided
that in the event Wakeman and Dixon separated, they would
“continue to provide for the child [as described above,] and that each
party [would] facilitate a close relationship with the other and
[would] continue to raise the child in a joint manner.”217 Dixon also
executed a designation of guardianship naming Wakeman as the
child’s guardian should the need arise.218 Wakeman and Dixon
prepared for the birth of their second child two and a half years
custody or visitation against legal mother in spite of the fact that the two had agreed to raise
the child together and share custody). 
212. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 670. 
213. Id. 
214. Id.
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
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later with a similar sperm donation agreement and executed an
identical co-parenting agreement and execution of guardianship.219
In short, for each of their two children, no fewer than three agree-
ments reflected the couple’s intent to care for the children jointly as
co-parents. The existence of these agreements reflects the sustained
efforts the couple went through to protect the family’s parent-child
relationships against a framework in which the default rules offered
no help at all. Nonetheless, when Dixon and Wakeman separated,
Dixon asserted that “Wakeman had no enforceable legal rights
regarding the children,” and the Florida courts agreed.220
In addition to serving as evidence of the couple’s intent, these
agreements also suggested an opportunity for Wakeman to style her
complaint as one seeking enforcement of contract, arguably offering
a procedural route to a custody determination on the merits that
would be unavailable under the state’s third-party standing require-
ments.221 The court could have accepted the invitation, issuing a
narrow, only-on-these-facts contract law determination conferring
parental rights on Wakeman without importing the concept of
functional parenthood into a statutory scheme that had declined to
recognize it. The court, however, deemed such agreements categori-
cally unenforceable and treated the case as indistinguishable from
one in which an unrelated third-party attempts to obtain visitation
in the absence of explicit co-parenting agreements.222 The court
treated Wakeman as a legal stranger to the two children and af-
firmed the dismissal of her complaint.223
The case is fascinating for its conclusion that a legal parent
cannot contract around the default parentage rules, giving effect to
what was at one time the parent’s considered judgment regarding
the best interests of her child.224 The court offered no discussion to
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 671, 673. 
221. The Florida statute governing standing in domestic relations disputes does not allow
nonparents to seek custody or visitation, and the Florida courts had held that they lacked
inherent authority to award visitation to nonparents. See Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Meeks v. Garner, 598 So. 2d 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). 
222. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 673. 
223. Id. 
224. This arguably fails to reflect the presumption, invoked in so many other contexts, that
a fit parent acts in the best interest of her child. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-
69 (2000). 
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illuminate the wisdom of adopting this prohibition, obscuring the
profound arguments that surely exist on either side of the issue.225
This is especially troubling given that Wakeman’s allegations
indicated that their family life reflected the principles of the co-
parenting agreements for the five years preceding the break-up.226
Assuming this to be true, the resulting bonds between Wakeman
and the children, and the harmful effects of severing these bonds,
would seem to warrant some attention in any discussion of the
enforceability of co-parenting agreements. A considered treatment
of this issue would address the reality that agreements between
parents are likely to influence family behavior in ways that directly
implicate the interests of the children, the supposed touchstone of
all child custody matters.227
This is not to suggest that importing contract principles into par-
entage determinations is unproblematic. Since the days of Baby M.,
courts and scholars have been skeptical that basic contract princi-
ples are adequate to protect the profound interests in play.228 But to
the extent that we worry about binding a legal mother to her earlier
commitment to share parentage with another, these very same
concerns would apply to voluntary acknowledgements of paternity,
a mechanism available in every state for unmarried opposite-sex
couples to confer legal fatherhood on the partner of a child’s birth
mother.229 In any event, had the court been willing to even consider
Wakeman’s proffer of a binding contractual agreement, it could have
deemed Wakeman and Dixon’s particular agreement to be unen-
forceable because it was coerced or involuntary, had Dixon adduced
facts to that effect. Or it might have concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to establish a mutual intent to share the rights and
responsibilities of co-parents. Instead, the court’s ruling renders
225. Any such discussion was similarly lacking in a prior case the court cited as estab-
lishing the unenforceability of co-parenting agreements. See Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 672;
Taylor v. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
226. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 671-78. 
227. For cases taking contrasting approaches to co-parenting agreements, see E.N.O. v.
L.M.N., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); see also JOSLIN & MINTER,
supra note 200, § 5:31.
228. See, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L.
REV. 345 (2011); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parent-
hood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323.
229. Harris, supra note 195, at 469, 475. 
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absolutely meaningless not only the family’s lived experience, but
the couple’s effort to formalize their understanding through
contractual mechanisms.230 This case exemplifies the qualities of
formalism that have driven it into such disrepute: a superficial
adherence to the statutory framework at the cost of the very
interests supposedly protected therein, and the failure to acknowl-
edge plausible alternative decisional pathways that might have
better harmonized the result with the substantive interests at
stake.231
It is little wonder, then, that a contrasting approach is emerging.
To avoid the kind of injustices described above and the manifest
harm to the children involved, courts have been increasingly respon-
sive to claims that someone who has functioned as a parent should
have some legally protectable rights that overcome the objection of
the legal parent, even when the statutory scheme makes no such
provision.232 Confronted with litigants who have shared parenting
responsibilities as pervasively as the couples described above, these
courts have allowed a functional parent the opportunity to demon-
strate a “parent-like relationship” and a “triggering event” that is
sufficient to justify the state’s intervention in the legal parent’s
relationship with her child.233 A functional parent who can make
these requisite showings is then entitled to a hearing at which she
can attempt to establish that continued contact would be in the
child’s best interests.234 A handful of jurisdictions have enacted
230. For more on the regulation of family relationships through private ordering, see Brian
Bix, Domestic Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1753, 1756 (2007); Brian H. Bix, Private
Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 249 (2010); Craig W. Christensen,
Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
1299, 1325-63 (1997); Howard Fink & June Carbone, Between Private Ordering and Public
Fiat: A New Paradigm for Family Law Decision-making, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1 (2003);
Katherine M. Swift, Parenting Agreements, the Potential Power of Contract, and the Limits
of Family Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2007).
231. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 323, 336 (2004) (“Our legal system’s claim that the best interests of children
serve as the guiding principle for all law relating to children is regularly ignored in reality.”). 
232. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
233. Id. at 421.
234. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959,
968 (R.I. 2000); H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.
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statutory provisions that afford some protection for functional or “de
facto” parents.235
It is easy to see why the “functional turn” in parentage, permit-
ting the recognition of “parental status based on behavior and the
resulting emotional ties and dependencies,” would be embraced as
a welcome development.236 Professor Carlos Ball has argued persua-
sively that the functional parenthood doctrine “has an important
role to play in the allocation of parental rights” and that individuals
who have functioned as parents should have “the opportunity to
demonstrate that granting them custody and visitation rights would
be in the children’s best interests.”237 Professor Melanie Jacobs has
advocated that “courts confer legal parentage on people who have
functioned as parents and/or intended to be parents” in situations
“when families do not comport with the traditional nuclear
family.”238 Professor Laura Kessler asserts that the law is “slowly
but surely moving toward a functional definition of parenthood.”239
She characterizes this trend as being particularly pronounced in
“the more progressive states,” and calls for policymakers to take
another step, providing for the legal recognition of “community
parenting” where multiple adults function as parents.240 While she
specifies that the article is offered as a “preliminary thought
experiment” and therefore “does not seek to work out in any detailed
fashion a set of legal rules for defining or regulating community
parenting,”241 she acknowledges that functional parenthood is “the
threshold question” that must be addressed prior to the recognition
of community parenting.242 Other scholars have similarly been
willing, to varying degrees, to consider what Professor Susan Frelich
235. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (2009); D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2009).
236. Appleton, supra note 2, at 16-17 (describing “family law’s functional turn” as “the rise
of standards that accord legal recognition to those who perform a family relationship,
regardless of the absence of formal or biological connections”); see also Appleton, supra note
179, at 271 (noting that “a strictly functional approach” has been recommended by com-
mentators “for a wide variety of family law problems”).
237. Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting Cases:
Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 668 (2012). 
238. Jacobs, supra note 177, at 333.
239. Kessler, supra note 197, at 55. 
240. See id. at 49, 63-65.
241. Id. at 52.
242. Id. at 77.
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Appleton calls “multi-parentage.”243 Multi-parentage questions can
certainly arise in situations where more than two parents claim the
sort of biological or marital connection upon which formal legal
parenthood has traditionally been predicated—in states that extend
the marital parentage presumption to same-sex couples, for
example, it is easy to imagine a biological mother, the woman to
whom she is married, and the male friend who assisted them in
conceiving all pressing parentage claims cast in formalist terms.
Nonetheless, much of the scholarly discourse surrounding multi-
parentage incorporates an acceptance of functional parenthood.244
It in fact suggests confidence that a functional approach is up to the
task of delineating parental status among numerous adults who are
in such profound conflict over the proper allocation of parental
rights and responsibilities that they seek judicial intervention to
resolve the dispute.245
It is one thing to acknowledge functional parenthood as an
important stopgap to which courts may resort246 in the absence of
other mechanisms that would protect a parent-child relationship
from lasting harm. But it is quite different to suggest that the law
of parentage should evolve toward an increasingly functional ap-
proach or that such an approach can serve as the foundation upon
which to build a framework that recognizes multiple parents. To do
so overlooks the shortcomings of the functional approach and
mistakes a deeply flawed stopgap for the promising future of par-
entage. A closer look at family law’s “functional turn,” undertaken
243. See Appleton, supra note 2, at 13.
244. See id. at 16-17 (“[A]ll those scholars considering multi-parentage emphasize modern
family law’s functional turn—the rise of standards that accord legal recognition to those who
perform a family relationship, regardless of the absence of formal or biological connections.”)
(footnotes omitted).
245. See Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-
Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 127 (2004) (“Mutual caregiving relationships,
in which an adult provides for the needs of a child, should be legally recognized. The level of
legal protection accorded should be appropriate for, reflective of, and limited to that which is
beneficial and necessary to protect and support the established caregiving relationship.
Further, the legal protection accorded should be granted in accordance with the protection for
practical parental decision-making authority necessary for life of each child.”) (emphasis
removed) (footnote omitted). 
246. Courts can make use of this stopgap at their own behest, through the common law
development of equitable principles, or at the direction of statutory provisions that ac-
knowledge functional parenthood. See, e.g., infra notes 247-58 and accompanying text. 
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below, reveals reasons to be skeptical that it should serve as a
model for family law decision making.
IV. THE COMPARATIVE VIRTUES OF A NEW FORMALISM
First, as a descriptive matter, some of the mechanisms noted by
scholars as evidence of positive trends toward recognizing functional
parenthood fall seriously short of what we might hope for in
protecting the relationships between co-parents and their children.
Consider, for example, the discourse surrounding Kentucky’s
custody statute, which defines “de facto custodians” and specifies
that they may participate in custody proceedings.247 One scholar
characterizes Kentucky as a state that has “recognized functional
parents by statute where certain conditions are met.”248 Other
scholars have invoked the same Kentucky statute as an instance of
states “equating functional status with formal status.”249 But the
statute confers “de facto custodian” status only on those who have
been the primary caretaker and the primary financial supporter of
the child in question.250 The asserted custodian has to demonstrate
these facts by clear and convincing evidence,251 and such standing
has to be demonstrated anew each time custody is disputed.252 It
should be evident how dissimilar this is from the procedural posture
occupied by those who enjoy formal legal status as parent; in order
to advance to a custody determination on the merits, legal parents
do not have to show that they are either the primary caretaker or
the primary financial supporter, much less that they are both.253
Such a showing is, almost by definition, only possible when the legal
parent is absent from the scene.254 Recall the dispute between Mary
247. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a)-(b) (2013). 
248. Kessler, supra note 197, at 65 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (1999)). 
249. Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 198, at 446 & n.138.
250. See Swiss v. Cabinet for Families & Children, 43 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that petitioner must be both primary caretaker and primary financial supporter to
satisfy statutory definition of de facto custodian).
251. § 403.270(1). 
252. Sullivan v. Tucker, 29 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).
253. See, e.g., Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1158-59, 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(explaining that the mother, who was awarded custody by the trial court, worked full-time
outside the home and shared child care responsibilities with a nanny, in spite of the fact that
father was unemployed). 
254. Kentucky courts have held that parenting the child alongside the natural parent does
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Wakeman and Dene Dixon, or the one between Leslea and Michelle
White, or any one of a large number of surprisingly similar cases in
which a biological or adoptive mother and her partner raised
children jointly as co-parents, manifesting every possible attribute
of shared parenting.255 The very fact that the couples in question
shared caretaking and financial responsibility equally would defeat
a claim brought by the non-legal mother to be recognized as a de
facto custodian under a statute like Kentucky’s. Whatever its
merits, the statute is simply inadequate for the task of recognizing
and adjudicating true co-parenthood.256
Other states permit the recognition of a de facto parent who has
co-parented the child alongside the child’s legal parent, but limit the
rights that can flow from such recognition, allowing de facto parents
not meet the de facto custodian standard in § 403.2701(1)(a). See B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310,
310-11 (Ky. 2006) (holding that a partner who lived with mother and mother’s adopted child
as a family did not have standing to seek custody because the child was in the physical
custody of the legal parent); Satterly v. Meredith, No. 2011-CA-001862-ME, 2012 WL 967502,
at *3, *5-6 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2012); Consalvi v. Cawood, 63 S.W.3d 195, 198 (Ky. Ct. App.
2001), abrogated on other grounds by Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003).
255. Such attributes include jointly planning and paying for the adoption or insemination;
giving the children hyphenated last names; sending out birth or adoption announcements
listing both parties as parents; taking maternity leave; shouldering financial responsibility;
attending school conferences, extracurricular activities, and doctor’s appointments; and
otherwise participating in daily nurturing and decision making regarding the children. See,
e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 548-50 (Colo. App. 2004); Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408, 409
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 188 (N.Y. 2010); Alison D.
v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28-29 (N.Y. 1991); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 961 (R.I.
2000); In re Wells, 373 S.W.3d 174, 175-76 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012); In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788,
791-92 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009); In re Smith, 262 S.W.3d 463, 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008); Miller-
Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 956 (Vt. 2006); In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421-
22 (Wis. 1995).
256. In one case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky acknowledged that someone could not be
a de facto custodian when she had co-parented the child with her former partner, the child’s
biological mother. Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 571, 574 (Ky. 2010). The co-parent
was able to obtain standing through a different statute, however, which confers standing on
a person “acting as a parent” when the person:
(a) Has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of
six (6) consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within one (1) year
immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding; and (b)
Has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody
under the law of this state.
Id. at 574-75, 577 (citing § 403.800(13)). Mullins was able to satisfy the requirement of
claiming “a right to legal custody under the law of this state” by pointing to an agreed
judgment of custody executed jointly by the parties and signed by the court prior to the
biological mother’s refusal to allow visitation. Id. at 575-77.
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to seek visitation but not to obtain custodial rights.257 Again, the
difference between being able to obtain visitation as a de facto
parent and being positioned to litigate the full scope of parental
rights and responsibilities as a legal parent should be plain.
Statutes like these provide some protection for the rights of
functional parents, but they certainly do not place them on equal
footing with formal legal parents.258
Moreover, as Professor Leslie Joan Harris has recognized, the
legal mechanisms available to render legal status on functional
parents are expensive and:
[generally] available only if, in hindsight, a court determines
that an unrelated adult has become a functional parent. The
latter feature alone means that unrelated adults who develop
relationships with children cannot rely on these devices to
protect those relationships. Exacerbating this problem is that all
the doctrines that allow courts to protect functional parent-child
relationships are indeterminate and discretionary.259
The upshot, as Professor Harris observes, is that “these doctrines
require that a claimant be able to bear the burden of extensive
litigation, and even then, outcomes are unpredictable.”260 This
should bring to mind the decades of criticism of the best-interests
standard and the multiple varieties of trouble associated with the
indeterminate and discretionary standards that have, to varying
257. Grossman, supra note 193, at 677 (citing H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 420 (holding that
a de facto parent cannot obtain custody unless the legal parent is unfit)).
258. For an exploration of the benefits of treating functional and formal parenthood as
separate domains with differing rights and obligations, see Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat,
supra note 198, at 449. The authors critique the assumption that parental rights and
obligations should be identical whether obtained through functional assessments or
traditional formal means, asserting that “functional parenthood should be its own status, not
simply an equitable tool when a person functionally mirrors the idealized notion of formal
parenthood.” Id.
259. Harris, supra note 195, at 471; see also Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note
198, at 436 (“A functional approach to parenthood, on the other hand, relies on the actual care
of children. As such, it can only be determined ex post and involves a considerable degree of
judicial discretion to determine what parental care actually is, what activities a person must
perform, and which behavior to demonstrate in order to gain recognition as someone who
functioned as a parent.”).
260. Harris, supra note 195, at 475; see also Julie Shapiro, Counting from One: Replacing
the Marital Presumption with a Presumption of Sole Parentage, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 509, 518 (2012) (noting that “functional/de facto parenthood ... lacks ... clarity”). 
2014] A NEW FORMALISM FOR FAMILY LAW 2059
degree, governed modification, jurisdiction, and child support.261 It
should raise the same skepticism about whether such an approach
is the best way to do justice for separating families.
There is, however, something even more troubling here than the
familiar shortcomings of indeterminate standards for family law
decision making. It is important to recognize that, whatever the
result, most of these cases reveal a recurring theme: in the face of
overwhelming evidence about the couple’s mutual intent to function
as joint parents, and a history of doing just that, the parent
privileged by her formal legal status wields that against her former
partner, exploiting it for all that it is worth procedurally and
substantively.262 Notably, this includes both cases in which the legal
parent is adoptive and those in which she is biologically related,
revealing that the current regime privileges formal legal status
rather than simply biology.263 In none of these cases are both of the
adults battling over custodial rights and responsibilities required to
establish that they were functional parents. The unequal status
creates an enormous power differential between co-parents, with
261. See supra Part II.
262. The legal mothers in these cases uniformly assert that their former partner has no
standing to initiate an action concerning their child and that the court is without power to
assess the claims on the merits. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 553 (Colo. App. 2004);
Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 928 (Del. 2011); Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 188 (N.Y.
2010); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d
959, 963 (R.I. 2000); In re Wells, 373 S.W.3d 174, 175 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012); In re C.T.H.S. and
C.R.H.S., 311 S.W.3d 204, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010); In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.2d 788, 790-92 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2009); In re Smith, 262 S.W.3d 465, 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); In re H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d  at 423. Other stratagems vary. In one case the biological mother married the sperm
donor, had him sign a paternity affidavit, and requested an amended birth certificate for the
child listing him as the father, in spite of the fact that the sperm donor and the two partners
had all signed notarized documents agreeing that the women would be the parents of the child
and the sperm donor would have no involvement. The marriage was admittedly in response
to her former partner’s efforts to obtain judicial protection of her relationship with the child.
In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 164 nn.1 & 3 (Wash. 2005). In another case the
biological mother sought to block her former partner’s access to the child even though the
partner had become a legally recognized parent via second-parent adoption. In an
unsuccessful effort to take advantage of interstate differences in adoption policy, the biological
mother urged the Florida court to disregard the Washington court’s adoption decree. Embry
v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, The
Impact of Troxel v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 Rutgers L.J. 825 (2001)
(explaining the impact of Troxel v. Granville on planned families with same-sex parents and
those parents’ conflicts with third-party relatives).
263. See, e.g., Smith, 16 A.3d at 924, 936 (adoptive); Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28 (biological). 
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every advantage residing in the hands of the parent who intends to
sever the relationship between her child and her former partner.
This inequity should garner more attention than it has. Even
when the co-parent succeeds in gaining some protection for her
relationship with the children,264 a fair assessment of the law’s turn
toward recognizing functional parenthood would compare the
burdens shouldered by the functional parent against the burdens
shouldered by the legal parent when the two are in conflict over
child custody. In the best case scenario, the co-parent has to litigate
under an indeterminate and unpredictable test twice, the legal
parent only once.265 In embracing the functional turn and proposing
its expansion, scholars have neglected to address the profound
procedural injustice visited upon co-parents who are forced to
litigate in the posture of a legal stranger just to gain access to a
judicial forum that can resolve the disputed custody issues on the
merits.266 
Although the growing recognition of functional parenthood is
praiseworthy in many ways, and certainly does more to further the
fundamental goals of family law than allowing a legally recognized
264. And then, it is not equivalent to full legal status. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has
One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian
Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 355 (2002) (“Notwithstanding the positive effect of applying
these quasi-parental doctrines to the petitioners, the result of these decisions is that the
lesbian coparent clearly occupies a much inferior status to that of the biological parent,
because quasi-parental doctrines do not confer a status comparable to legal parenthood.”).
265. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text; see also Harris, supra note 195, at 474
(discussing Smith, 16 A.3d 920). In fact, this considerably understates the legal wrangling in
Smith. After the state supreme court held that the statutory scheme did not permit courts to
recognize someone in the former partner’s position as a de facto parent, the legislature
amended the statute to provide that someone in her position could be recognized as such.
Smith, 16 A.3d at 928. The legal mother then asserted that the provision violated due process,
equal protection, separation of powers, and the state constitution’s “single-subject”
requirement; she also asserted that the new custody petition was barred by res judicata and
the principle against retroactive application of statutes. Id. at 923, 925-27, 933, 935. What all
of these disparate legal theories had in common was that each would have barred the court
from even holding a custody hearing. By the time the state supreme court rejected these
assertions and affirmed the family court’s award of joint custody, the parties had been
litigating for nearly seven years. See id. at 920, 923-24.
266. See JOSLIN & MINTER, supra note 200, at 455 (“In jurisdictions that permit non-legal
parents to establish standing by demonstrating that they meet the criteria for de facto
parentage or similar equitable doctrines cases, courts may bifurcate the proceedings,
requiring the petitioner to prove that a de facto parent-child relationship exists before
determining whether custody or visitation is in the child’s best interests.”).
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parent to sever the ties between a child and a separated co-parent
because the latter lacks formal legal status, lauding these develop-
ments as evidence of family law’s “functional turn” obscures the
extent to which formal legal status is still the hard currency in
parentage disputes. Having the opportunity to demonstrate that one
has functioned as a parent is better than nothing, but the practical
difference between being formally recognized as a legal parent and
being adjudicated the functional equivalent is enormous. As several
scholars have observed, those in the former category enjoy their
status automatically and immediately, whereas those in the latter
category need to call on the state, subjecting themselves to a process
that can be lengthy, intrusive, costly, and unpredictable.267
That this is so should not be surprising, in light of what we have
learned about family law’s experiences with flexible and discretion-
ary frameworks in child custody and child support.268 At least in
those contexts, however, it can be said that the parties to the
dispute share those costs more or less equally, in the sense that they
are similarly situated with respect to the burden of litigation and
the risk of loss.269 In the parentage context, we should be particu-
larly hesitant to accept the costs of a lengthy, intrusive, expensive,
and unpredictable process, given that they are primarily borne by
the parent who has been cut off from her children by the formal
legal parent.
This utterly one-sided burden complicates the assumption that a
functionalist approach tracks with a substantively progressive
agenda.270 As compared to the traditional formalist approach that
treats co-parents as legal strangers, a functionalist approach
reflects a willingness to recognize and adapt to social change and
advance values of inclusion and equity. But obtaining recognition as
a functional parent is an uncertain and extraordinarily burdensome
267. See Appleton, supra note 179, at 233-34; Polikoff, supra note 200, at 207; Shapiro,
supra note 200, at 518. 
268. See supra Parts II.A, II.C. 
269. Shapiro, supra note 183, at 823 (“In a custody dispute between two legally-recognized
parents, the parties begin the litigation on an equal footing. While one parent may ultimately
demonstrate that she or he should be awarded sole custody, neither parent begins with any
special advantage over the other. In contrast, when lesbian mothers litigate custody, the legal
mother begins with a nearly insurmountable advantage over the non-legal mother.”)
(footnotes omitted).
270. See Kessler, supra note 197, at 52.
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endeavor. It is a manifestly inferior route to parental status than
the immediate and automatic vesting of parental rights that formal
legal parents enjoy. That it is the best some parents can hope for
reflects the persistence of inequality, not the repudiation of
inequality.271
We should be concerned about this gap, and we should endeavor
to close it. And so the question that has to be addressed is whether
the law can continue to rely on a functional approach to parentage
for nontraditional families—one that assigns parental rights to
some on the basis of an inquiry that is necessarily retrospective and
indeterminate—without perpetuating this inequity.272 One possi-
bility, of course, is to rework parentage altogether, eliminating
determinate routes to legal parenthood for everyone in favor of
a universal functional approach—one that accords no privilege
to biology or marriage, places all potential parental claimants on
the same footing, and allows multiple adults to be vested with
271. See Bix, Domestic Agreements, supra note 230, at 1756 (“It is hard to find the words
to describe the removal of a parent—if some would object that this begs the question, let one
say the removal of ‘someone who is acting in the role of a parent’—from a child's life, and the
child from that person's life, and this after a solemn promise was made not to engage in this
action. Many appalling things happen in this world, but I doubt that there are many harms
more shameful than this, where it is also the case that the perpetrator publicly seeks judicial
approval for her actions, and has a good chance of obtaining it.”).
272. Readers might query whether the universal recognition of marriage rights for same-
sex couples would provide a sufficient solution to the problems discussed in this section.
Certainly, extending the marital parentage presumption to same-sex couples provides
automatic and immediate protection for relationships between non-biological co-parents and
their children, making marriage equality especially important from a child welfare
perspective. As courts, scholars, and advocates have emphasized, the children of same-sex
couples suffer tangible and unjustifiable harms from the unequal treatment their parents
receive under traditional marriage laws. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2694 (2013) (explaining that such treatment “humiliates tens of thousands of children now
being raised by same-sex couples”); Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying
Same-Sex Marriage from the Perspective of a Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 412
(1999); Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1589 (2013). It would be misguided, however, to focus exclusively on marriage in
searching for ways to better protect parent-child relationships. Marriage is not the sole
determinant of legal parentage for opposite-sex couples, see Jacobs, supra note 177, at 346
(“Statutes in every state provide for the custody, support, and maintenance of children born
to heterosexual parents, whether married or unmarried.”), and in fact, constitutional
principles prohibit this, see Grossman, supra note 193, at 672-73. So although equalizing
access to marriage is an indisputably important aspect of achieving equality in family law,
there are good reasons to consider simultaneously alternative paths to legal parentage for
same-sex couples.
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protectable rights to parent the children with whom they have
relationships.273
For a variety of reasons, this is the wrong way to equalize access
to parental status. Simply put, this would be equalizing down,
relegating more rather than fewer families to the discretion and
indeterminacy that has proven so troubling in other areas of family
law. Whatever differences we may sustain regarding how best to
promote child welfare both generally and in individual cases, it is
difficult to argue that children are best served by a regime that
cannot identify their parents prospectively and cannot ensure that
any given individual is vested with parental status without a
complex, multi-factor judicial determination.274
Although advocates of the functional turn have acknowledged
the difficult line drawing it entails,275 their recognition seems to
pertain to the first-order business of drafting definitions and setting
parameters for the allocation of parental rights, rather than the sec-
ond-order business of applying the definitions in particular cases,276
even though the latter stage is where individual families sustain
process costs. When evaluating the two stages in combination, the
273. To be sure, not all proponents of multi-parentage would go this far. Katharine
Bartlett, in the original scholarly treatment of multi-parentage, specified that she would allow
nonparents to exercise parental rights when the child’s relationship with the legal parent has
been disrupted in some way, making clear that she would retain notions of formal legal
parenthood. See Bartlett, supra note 182, at 946. But scholars who advocate an expansion of
parenthood beyond the “rule of two” are often unclear about the extent to which they see a
continued role for notions of formal legal parenthood. The proposals do not explicitly call for
an abandonment of formal legal parenthood; rather, multi-parentage supporters argue for the
expansion of functional parenthood without attempting to locate or defend the line that would
remain between formal and functional parenthood. Other advocates propose tiers of
parenthood, according relative rights on the basis of the amount of caretaking someone has
provided. Jacobs, supra note 177, at 333. But this does not actually specify whether some
individuals start from the profoundly advantaged position of a formal legal parent, begging
the question of who should benefit from formal legal status and who, by contrast, must invoke
the state’s judicial machinery to obtain recognition as a functional parent. 
274. But see Appleton, supra note 179, at 275 (suggesting that a woman gestating a
pregnancy will always meet a functional test for parenthood, “given the unique parental
functions she has performed during pregnancy, including prenatal shelter, nurture,
sustenance, and protection of the child-to-be”).
275. Appleton, supra note 2, at 27. 
276. Kessler, for example, acknowledges that it will “require careful line drawing” to avoid
“elevating sperm donors, mere ex-lovers, and babysitters to the status of parent” and
characterizes this as a “law reform project” that is “delicate and difficult” but ultimately
“achievable.” Kessler, supra note 197, at 76. 
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astonishing degree of state involvement necessary to operationalize
a truly functionalist regime becomes apparent. One need not reify
the justifiably disputed notion of family privacy to be troubled by
this aspect.277 As Professor James Dwyer has pointed out, state
intervention in parentage is inescapable, regardless of how parent-
age is defined, given that the rules governing the recognition of
parenthood always come from the state.278 But viewed from the
perspective of families for whom it may become important to
ascertain legal parentage, there is a material difference between a
mode of state involvement that sets forth categories of parenthood
that are automatically and immediately applicable and a mode of
state involvement that requires judicial determinations on an
individualized, case-by-case, and typically retrospective basis. The
weakness of the latter model is particularly acute in light of the fact
that many families, even those that have consulted with lawyers or
memorialized their intentions in written agreements, do not turn to
the courts for parentage determinations until junctures of conflict
and strife—often, in a posture of total disagreement about the rights
and responsibilities of each parent.279 A system in which both
parents were required to demonstrate that they had earned legally
recognizable and enforceable parental status by functioning in that
role would resolve the equality concerns raised above, but has little
else to commend it—the law should endeavor to offer these families
more than the uncertainty and unpredictability of an evenhanded
functionalist approach.
Instead, access to determinate mechanisms for formalizing
parent-child relationships should be expanded, making stability and
certainty accessible to all—regardless of gender, sexual orientation,
277. For an influential critique of the concept of family privacy, see Frances E. Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983);
see also David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527 (2000). 
278. JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 26 (2006). 
279. Although some of the cases reflect disagreement about the amount of visitation or the
conditions under which a court should award it, all too many of them reflect a posture in
which the legal parent is asserting that her former partner has absolutely no right ever to see
her children again. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. It is revealing that some of the
cases that the multi-parentage advocates repeatedly invoke present scenarios in which the
three parties agree that they should each enjoy some legally recognized relationship with the
child in question. See, e.g., Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
Cases in which there is no opposition to the recognition of parental status are not the norm
and do not provide an effective template for crafting a parentage regime.
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or marital status.280 Scholars have expressed skepticism about the
weight to be accorded the values of stability and certainty in
crafting a parentage regime;281 to be sure, these values have been
invoked in favor of unjust legal rules and exclusionary results.282
And I agree that “whatever gains in certainty may accompany a
narrow understanding of parenthood” do not justify the “categorical
refusal to recognize the parentage status of individuals” who have
raised children as equal partners with the children’s legal
parents.283 But taking this position does not require that we reject
certainty as a value to embrace and prioritize when doing so is
compatible with, rather than hostile to, the recognition of co-
parents.
There are reasons to preserve the certainty, stability, and
exclusivity that compose the parental prerogative in a formalist
regime even as we reject the hetero-normativity and bio-normativity
of previous frameworks. Professor Emily Buss, for example, has
argued persuasively that an approach that allows courts to divvy up
“fragments of parental authority” among numerous potential
claimants is harmful to children because it diffuses the child-specific
expertise that, for the most part, makes parents the most competent
decision makers for their children.284 Professor June Carbone offers
the insight that parenthood is “constitutive of the child’s identity”
and that therefore the determination of parenthood must provide a
measure of permanence, continuity, and stability.285 Professor
Elizabeth Bartholet has similarly argued that children do better
280. Polikoff, supra note 200, at 216 (“[My] primary goal ... is certainty and stability of a
child’s relationship with both parents without requiring those parents to spend the money or
time necessary for a court proceeding. Parentage based on presumption requires no court
involvement; that is its strength.”). 
281. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 237, at 625-26. Ball argues that “concerns regarding
uncertainty in the application of equitable parenthood doctrines are greatly overblown.” Id.
at 626; see also Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social
Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 318 (“Consistency for its own
sake, however, is not a virtue.”).
282. William C. Duncan, “Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down”: The “Functional” Definition of
Family—Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 60-61 (2001); see
Duncan, supra note 210, at 263; Shapiro, supra note 260, at 522 (characterizing the two
parent dyadic model as “one of the most entrenched family values constraining formation of
queer families”).
283. Ball, supra note 237, at 626. 
284. Buss, supra note 78, at 682. 
285. See Carbone, supra note 185, at 1334.
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when parental authority is concentrated in two clearly identified
parents who enjoy that status from the time of the child’s birth.286
Moreover, although scholars may disagree about the optimal level
of fluidity and flexibility in legal definitions of parenthood, the very
cases in which a court is asked to recognize and protect a co-parent’s
relationship with her children show a remarkably uniform model of
parenting, in which caretaking and financial responsibility were
shared equally and exclusively between two people in a committed
relationship. This model has not lost its salience as same-sex
relationships and reproductive technology have become more
prevalent. To the contrary, what is perhaps most remarkable about
many of the wrenching custody disputes between former partners
is how fully the couple embraced a vision of parenthood similar in
most regards to the now thoroughly critiqued “nuclear family.”
Especially in the face of these lived experiences, a legal regime that
offers only the protection of a retrospective functional assessment
to one of the parents is inadequate. Not only does it fail to reflect
the intent upon which these families were formed, but it relies upon
exactly the sort of discretionary and indeterminate frameworks that
have proven so troubling in other areas of family law.
In reforming the law of parentage to meet the needs of these
families, courts and lawmakers should seek to build a new formal-
ism, one that provides the same level of certainty, stability, and
exclusivity that married, heterosexual parents have traditionally
enjoyed. Scholars have identified some mechanisms that work
toward this goal; I mention some highlights here without attempt-
ing to recreate their detailed and comprehensive efforts. Professor
Nancy Polikoff has proposed that the law confer parental status on
a woman who consents to the artificial insemination of her partner
with the intent to be the parent of the resulting child.287 Professor
Leslie Joan Harris has proposed that same-sex couples be afforded
the same opportunity to execute voluntary acknowledgments of
parentage that unmarried opposite sex couples currently enjoy.288
286. Bartholet, supra note 231, at 338, 342; see also Marsha Garrison, Law Making for
Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 835, 895 (2000) (asserting that law should be guided by two principles: “children's
interests come first and two-parent care is generally preferable to that of one parent alone”).
287. See Polikoff, supra note 200, at 233. 
288. See Harris, supra note 195, at 470. 
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These reforms, offered alongside the marital parentage presumption
that will grow in relevance as same-sex couples obtain increased
access to marriage,289 will start to close the gap between parents
who enjoy the security of formal legal status and those who
currently have neither the opportunity to obtain such recognition
nor the accompanying protection for their parent-child relationship.
Much work remains to be done. As Professor Susan Frelich
Appleton has pointed out, parentage rules that provide a tolerable
balance between determinacy and context-sensitivity for lesbian co-
parents might not transfer seamlessly to gay male couples who
engage the assistance of a surrogate to create their families.290 For
these scenarios, when the surrogate’s role in gestation provides a
powerful counterpoint to the couple’s intent to serve as the child’s
parents, it is more difficult to craft default rules that can balance
the competing interests without judicial intervention. Nonetheless,
even in these situations, the law can offer improved access to
determinate mechanisms for formalizing family relationships;
Appleton envisions a pre-birth registration procedure that would
allow gay male couples and the women who agree to bear their
children an opportunity to show who will serve as the child-to-be’s
parents.291
There are certainly considerable challenges to operationalizing a
new formalism. It will not only require the identification of new
categories of people who might warrant formal legal status as
parents—partners of artificially inseminated women, for example,
or gay husbands of men whose biologically related child is being
carried by a surrogate—but will also entail complex and contestable
assessments about the extent to which individuals in those catego-
ries should enjoy such status automatically and with little or no
judicial intervention. At this stage, what is essential is to recognize
that such a project is undergirded by compelling equality concerns
that are simply not as well effectuated in a regime that relies on
289. But see Appleton, supra note 179, at 260-93 (explaining that the functional approach
to the presumption cannot justify extending the presumption to gay male couples). 
290. See id. at 294.
291. See id. at 289; see also Fink & Carbone, supra note 230, at 3-4 (suggesting “pre-birth
identification”). 
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post hoc functionalist assessments for disputes involving nontradi-
tional families.292
CONCLUSION
The procedural values of simplicity, certainty, and minimal
judicial intervention should be accorded great weight in the design
of legal regimes governing the family. That in itself is not a novel
proposition; scholars have long recognized the need for predictabil-
ity and stability in family law. But the association of these values
with traditionalist regimes, and the deeply felt reluctance to jettison
sensitivity to context in the family law realm, has tempered the
willingness to embrace determinacy as a metric by which family law
frameworks should be judged. Particularly in areas of family law
that uniquely concern nontraditional families, flexibility and
sensitivity to context appear to be a welcome antidote to the kind of
formalism that ratifies a legal parent’s choice to destroy a fully
formed parent-child relationship.
Be that as it may, scholars and lawmakers should aspire to offer
these families something better than post hoc functionalist assess-
ments of the relationships in question. Such a solution accepts the
very indeterminacy and judicial discretion that reformers have
labored to diminish in other areas of family law. Not only does the
functionalist approach present enormous process costs for nontradi-
tional families, but as currently practiced it imposes these unevenly,
forcing some parents to litigate in the posture of a legal stranger
while their former partners leverage the procedural and substantive
advantages of formal legal status. These defects militate in favor of
a parentage reform agenda that deploys formalist principles to
advance fundamental equality concerns. Building out the new
formalism will demand difficult judgments about the categories of
parents who ought to enjoy the stability and certainty of formal
legal status. We must start, however, by acknowledging that
nontraditional families will be better served by such a regime and
292. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 231, at 338 (considering a variety of substantive factors
the law should incorporate in assigning legal parenthood, but observing that “[m]ore
important than the weight given to particular substantive factors is for the system to have
clear rules establishing permanent parenthood early”). 
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that it is a reimagined formalism, rather than an expanded
functionalism, to which we should aspire.
